quagga: uprev it to 0.99.23

uprev it to 0.99.23
remove patches which have been in the latest version

Signed-off-by: Roy Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 106 deletions

diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/quagga/files/0001-ospfd-CVE-2013-2236-stack-overrun-in-apiserver.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/quagga/files/0001-ospfd-CVE-2013-2236-stack-overrun-in-apiserver.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 30b05c262f..0000000000
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/quagga/files/0001-ospfd-CVE-2013-2236-stack-overrun-in-apiserver.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-Subject: [PATCH] ospfd: CVE-2013-2236, stack overrun in apiserver
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-the OSPF API-server (exporting the LSDB and allowing announcement of
-Opaque-LSAs) writes past the end of fixed on-stack buffers.  This leads
-to an exploitable stack overflow.
-
-For this condition to occur, the following two conditions must be true:
-- Quagga is configured with --enable-opaque-lsa
-- ospfd is started with the "-a" command line option
-
-If either of these does not hold, the relevant code is not executed and
-the issue does not get triggered.
-
-Since the issue occurs on receiving large LSAs (larger than 1488 bytes),
-it is possible for this to happen during normal operation of a network.
-In particular, if there is an OSPF router with a large number of
-interfaces, the Router-LSA of that router may exceed 1488 bytes and
-trigger this, leading to an ospfd crash.
-
-For an attacker to exploit this, s/he must be able to inject valid LSAs
-into the OSPF domain.  Any best-practice protection measure (using
-crypto authentication, restricting OSPF to internal interfaces, packet
-filtering protocol 89, etc.) will prevent exploitation.  On top of that,
-remote (not on an OSPF-speaking network segment) attackers will have
-difficulties bringing up the adjacency needed to inject a LSA.
-
-This patch only performs minimal changes to remove the possibility of a
-stack overrun.  The OSPF API in general is quite ugly and needs a
-rewrite.
-
-Reported-by: Ricky Charlet <ricky.charlet@hp.com>
-Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
----
- ospfd/ospf_api.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_api.c b/ospfd/ospf_api.c
-index 74a49e3..fae942e 100644
---- a/ospfd/ospf_api.c
-+++ b/ospfd/ospf_api.c
-@@ -472,6 +472,9 @@ new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
-   emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
-   emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
-   emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
-+  if (len > sizeof (buf))
-+    len = sizeof(buf);
-+  /* API broken - missing memcpy to fill data */
-   return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
- }
- 
-@@ -488,6 +491,9 @@ new_msg_sync_lsdb (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
-   smsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
-   smsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
-   smsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
-+  if (len > sizeof (buf))
-+    len = sizeof(buf);
-+  /* API broken - missing memcpy to fill data */
-   return msg_new (MSG_SYNC_LSDB, smsg, seqnum, len);
- }
- 
-@@ -501,13 +507,15 @@ new_msg_originate_request (u_int32_t seqnum,
-   int omsglen;
-   char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
- 
--  omsglen = sizeof (struct msg_originate_request) - sizeof (struct lsa_header)
--    + ntohs (data->length);
--
-   omsg = (struct msg_originate_request *) buf;
-   omsg->ifaddr = ifaddr;
-   omsg->area_id = area_id;
--  memcpy (&omsg->data, data, ntohs (data->length));
-+
-+  omsglen = ntohs (data->length);
-+  if (omsglen > sizeof (buf) - offsetof (struct msg_originate_request, data))
-+    omsglen = sizeof (buf) - offsetof (struct msg_originate_request, data);
-+  memcpy (&omsg->data, data, omsglen);
-+  omsglen += sizeof (struct msg_originate_request) - sizeof (struct lsa_header);
- 
-   return msg_new (MSG_ORIGINATE_REQUEST, omsg, seqnum, omsglen);
- }
-@@ -627,13 +635,16 @@ new_msg_lsa_change_notify (u_char msgtype,
-   assert (data);
- 
-   nmsg = (struct msg_lsa_change_notify *) buf;
--  len = ntohs (data->length) + sizeof (struct msg_lsa_change_notify)
--    - sizeof (struct lsa_header);
-   nmsg->ifaddr = ifaddr;
-   nmsg->area_id = area_id;
-   nmsg->is_self_originated = is_self_originated;
-   memset (&nmsg->pad, 0, sizeof (nmsg->pad));
--  memcpy (&nmsg->data, data, ntohs (data->length));
-+
-+  len = ntohs (data->length);
-+  if (len > sizeof (buf) - offsetof (struct msg_lsa_change_notify, data))
-+    len = sizeof (buf) - offsetof (struct msg_lsa_change_notify, data);
-+  memcpy (&nmsg->data, data, len);
-+  len += sizeof (struct msg_lsa_change_notify) - sizeof (struct lsa_header);
- 
-   return msg_new (msgtype, nmsg, seqnum, len);
- }
--- 
-1.7.5.4
-