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authorAndrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>2018-09-04 17:58:54 +0200
committerKhem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>2018-09-05 08:04:22 -0700
commitba82e1b5ec9a885ef3e554af917b8db5982e59d3 (patch)
tree339dba6334e5692f0906aece352c26cee6c3147c /meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd
parenta09e43e371261a50ee93a3d97eeac38cce3bfd88 (diff)
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hostapd: fix CVE-2018-14526
Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted flag set, but not the MIC flag. Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd')
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch44
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb1
2 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..522fc394b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526
+
+[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
+
+wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961]
+CVE: CVE-2018-14526
+Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+
+ if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++ /*
++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++ * which is the case in this code branch.
++ */
++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++ goto out;
++ }
+ if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ &key_data_len))
+ goto out;
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
index 250add875..42aae4279 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
+ file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"