diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool')
8 files changed, 0 insertions, 737 deletions
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-Migrate-to-openssl-1.1.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-Migrate-to-openssl-1.1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 394aa16adc..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-Migrate-to-openssl-1.1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ -From c9dcb6afef9c343d070aaff208d11a997a45a105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> -Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 22:19:38 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] Migrate to openssl 1.1 - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceforge.net/p/ipmitool/source/ci/1664902525a1c3771b4d8b3ccab7ea1ba6b2bdd1/] - -Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> ---- - src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++---------- - 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c -index d5fac37..9652a5e 100644 ---- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c -+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c -@@ -164,11 +164,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - uint8_t * output, - uint32_t * bytes_written) - { -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); -- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); -- -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - *bytes_written = 0; - -@@ -182,6 +178,14 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - printbuf(input, input_length, "encrypting this data"); - } - -+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ if (ctx == NULL) { -+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed"); -+ return; -+ } -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx); -+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - - /* - * The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input -@@ -191,28 +195,28 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0); - - -- if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length)) -+ if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length)) - { - /* Error */ - *bytes_written = 0; -- return; - } - else - { - uint32_t tmplen; - -- if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen)) -+ if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen)) - { -+ /* Error */ - *bytes_written = 0; -- return; /* Error */ - } - else - { - /* Success */ - *bytes_written += tmplen; -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - } - } -+ /* performs cleanup and free */ -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - } - - -@@ -239,11 +243,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - uint8_t * output, - uint32_t * bytes_written) - { -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); -- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0); -- -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - if (verbose >= 5) - { -@@ -252,12 +252,20 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - printbuf(input, input_length, "decrypting this data"); - } - -- - *bytes_written = 0; - - if (input_length == 0) - return; - -+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ if (ctx == NULL) { -+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed"); -+ return; -+ } -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx); -+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); -+ - /* - * The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input - * data is perfectly aligned. We would like to keep that from happening. -@@ -266,33 +274,33 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_t * iv, - assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0); - - -- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length)) -+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length)) - { - /* Error */ - lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt update failed"); - *bytes_written = 0; -- return; - } - else - { - uint32_t tmplen; - -- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen)) -+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen)) - { -+ /* Error */ - char buffer[1000]; - ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), buffer); - lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "the ERR error %s", buffer); - lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt final failed"); - *bytes_written = 0; -- return; /* Error */ - } - else - { - /* Success */ - *bytes_written += tmplen; -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - } - } -+ /* performs cleanup and free */ -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - - if (verbose >= 5) - { diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch deleted file mode 100644 index eadfb7ead3..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 24aed93efb30a8f557aedc2f03b6ccec758ccbf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:44:18 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] fru: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_spd_print_fru - -Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -The `ipmi_spd_print_fru` function has a similar issue as the one fixed -by the previous commit in `read_fru_area_section`. An initial request is -made to get the `fru.size`, which is used as the size for the allocation -of `spd_data`. Inside a loop, further requests are performed to get the -copy sizes which are not checked before being used as the size for a -copy into the buffer. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/840fb1cbb4fb365cb9797300e3374d4faefcdb10] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - lib/dimm_spd.c | 9 ++++++++- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/lib/dimm_spd.c b/lib/dimm_spd.c -index 91ae117..4c9c21d 100644 ---- a/lib/dimm_spd.c -+++ b/lib/dimm_spd.c -@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id) - struct ipmi_rq req; - struct fru_info fru; - uint8_t *spd_data, msg_data[4]; -- int len, offset; -+ uint32_t len, offset; - - msg_data[0] = id; - -@@ -1091,6 +1091,13 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id) - } - - len = rsp->data[0]; -+ if(rsp->data_len < 1 -+ || len > rsp->data_len - 1 -+ || len > fru.size - offset) -+ { -+ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); -+ return -1; -+ } - memcpy(&spd_data[offset], rsp->data + 1, len); - offset += len; - } while (offset < fru.size); --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b65e3ef1a6..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@ -From e824c23316ae50beb7f7488f2055ac65e8b341f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:33:59 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities - -Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of -requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not -respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the -unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is -larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer. - -The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/e824c23316ae50beb7f7488f2055ac65e8b341f2] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - lib/ipmi_fru.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c -index c2a139d..2e323ff 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c -@@ -663,7 +663,10 @@ int - read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf) - { -- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish; -+ uint32_t off = offset; -+ uint32_t tmp; -+ uint32_t finish; -+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer; - struct ipmi_rs * rsp; - struct ipmi_rq req; - uint8_t msg_data[4]; -@@ -676,10 +679,12 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - - finish = offset + length; - if (finish > fru->size) { -+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size); - finish = fru->size; - lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, " - "Adjusting to %d", - offset + length, finish - offset); -+ length = finish - offset; - } - - memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); -@@ -715,6 +720,7 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - } - } - -+ size_left_in_buffer = length; - do { - tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off; - msg_data[0] = id; -@@ -756,9 +762,18 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - } - - tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0]; -+ if(rsp->data_len < 1 -+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1 -+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer) -+ { -+ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - memcpy(frubuf, rsp->data + 1, tmp); - off += tmp; - frubuf += tmp; -+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp; - /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command - * is too large. return 0 so higher level function - * still attempts to parse what was returned */ -@@ -791,7 +806,9 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf) - { - static uint32_t fru_data_rqst_size = 20; -- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish; -+ uint32_t off = offset; -+ uint32_t tmp, finish; -+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer; - struct ipmi_rs * rsp; - struct ipmi_rq req; - uint8_t msg_data[4]; -@@ -804,10 +821,12 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - - finish = offset + length; - if (finish > fru->size) { -+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size); - finish = fru->size; - lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, " - "Adjusting to %d", - offset + length, finish - offset); -+ length = finish - offset; - } - - memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); -@@ -822,6 +841,8 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - if (fru->access && fru_data_rqst_size > 16) - #endif - fru_data_rqst_size = 16; -+ -+ size_left_in_buffer = length; - do { - tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off; - msg_data[0] = id; -@@ -853,8 +874,16 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, - } - - tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0]; -+ if(rsp->data_len < 1 -+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1 -+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer) -+ { -+ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); -+ return -1; -+ } - memcpy((frubuf + off)-offset, rsp->data + 1, tmp); - off += tmp; -+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp; - - /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command - * is too large. return 0 so higher level function --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-hpmfwupg-move-variable-definition-to-.c-file.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-hpmfwupg-move-variable-definition-to-.c-file.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a765c3ab2f..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0001-hpmfwupg-move-variable-definition-to-.c-file.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From 3f7bb7218181745ca7762c1b4832cbb1c9e692f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com> -Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 11:26:32 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] hpmfwupg: move variable definition to .c file - -Upstream-Status: Pending -Signed-off-by: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com> ---- - include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h | 2 +- - lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h -index de65292..07f597b 100644 ---- a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h -+++ b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h -@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ typedef struct _VERSIONINFO { - char descString[HPMFWUPG_DESC_STRING_LENGTH + 1]; - }VERSIONINFO, *PVERSIONINFO; - --VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX]; -+extern VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX]; - - #define TARGET_VER (0x01) - #define ROLLBACK_VER (0x02) -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c b/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c -index bbcffc0..d7cdcd6 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c -@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ ipmi_intf_get_max_request_data_size(struct ipmi_intf * intf); - - extern int verbose; - -+VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX]; -+ - int HpmfwupgUpgrade(struct ipmi_intf *intf, char *imageFilename, - int activate, int, int); - int HpmfwupgValidateImageIntegrity(struct HpmfwupgUpgradeCtx *pFwupgCtx); --- -2.28.0 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0002-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0002-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b8742b1a81..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0002-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 81144cfba131b4ddbfcf9c530274b23bfc7e0ea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:51:49 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] session: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_get_session_info - -Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -The `ipmi_get_session_info` function does not properly check the -response `data_len`, which is used as a copy size, allowing stack buffer -overflow. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/41d7026946fafbd4d1ec0bcaca3ea30a6e8eed22] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - lib/ipmi_session.c | 12 ++++++++---- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_session.c b/lib/ipmi_session.c -index 4855bc4..71bef4c 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_session.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_session.c -@@ -319,8 +319,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf, - } - else - { -- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len); -- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len); -+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, -+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); -+ print_session_info(&session_info, -+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); - } - break; - -@@ -351,8 +353,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf, - break; - } - -- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len); -- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len); -+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, -+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); -+ print_session_info(&session_info, -+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); - - } while (i <= session_info.session_slot_count); - break; --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0003-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0003-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch deleted file mode 100644 index deebd356a7..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0003-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -From 5057761e30e3a7682edab60f98f631616392ddc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:56:38 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] channel: Fix buffer overflow -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check -the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow -on the final copy. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/9452be87181a6e83cfcc768b3ed8321763db50e4] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -[Make some changes to apply it] -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - include/ipmitool/ipmi_channel.h | 2 ++ - lib/ipmi_channel.c | 10 ++++++++-- - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_channel.h b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_channel.h -index b138c26..d7cce5e 100644 ---- a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_channel.h -+++ b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_channel.h -@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ struct channel_access_t { - uint8_t user_level_auth; - }; - -+#define MAX_CIPHER_SUITE_DATA_LEN 0x10 -+ - /* - * The Get Authentication Capabilities response structure - * From table 22-15 of the IPMI v2.0 spec -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_channel.c b/lib/ipmi_channel.c -index fab2e54..76ecdcd 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_channel.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_channel.c -@@ -378,7 +378,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ipmi_intf *intf, const char *payload_type, - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites"); - return -1; - } -- if (rsp->ccode > 0) { -+ if (rsp->ccode -+ || rsp->data_len < 1 -+ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + MAX_CIPHER_SUITE_DATA_LEN) -+ { - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s", - val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals)); - return -1; -@@ -413,7 +416,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ipmi_intf *intf, const char *payload_type, - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites"); - return -1; - } -- if (rsp->ccode > 0) { -+ if (rsp->ccode -+ || rsp->data_len < 1 -+ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + MAX_CIPHER_SUITE_DATA_LEN) -+ { - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s", - val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals)); - return -1; --- -2.18.1 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0004-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0004-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b5ce9e92ec..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0004-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -From e6aa6076f65e71544bd6450d20d943d7baaccb9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:06:39 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] lanp: Fix buffer overflows in get_lan_param_select -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -The `get_lan_param_select` function is missing a validation check on the -response’s `data_len`, which it then returns to caller functions, where -stack buffer overflow can occur. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/d45572d71e70840e0d4c50bf48218492b79c1a10] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -[Make some changes to apply it] -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - lib/ipmi_lanp.c | 14 +++++++------- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c -index 060e753..dee21ee 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c -@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - /* set new ipaddr */ - memcpy(data+3, temp, 4); - printf("Setting LAN Alert %d IP Address to %d.%d.%d.%d\n", alert, -@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - /* set new macaddr */ - memcpy(data+7, temp, 6); - printf("Setting LAN Alert %d MAC Address to " -@@ -1947,7 +1947,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - - if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "def", 3) == 0 || - strncasecmp(argv[1], "default", 7) == 0) { -@@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - - if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "on", 2) == 0 || - strncasecmp(argv[1], "yes", 3) == 0) { -@@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - - if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "pet", 3) == 0) { - printf("Setting LAN Alert %d destination to PET Trap\n", alert); -@@ -2026,7 +2026,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - - if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[2]) != 0) { - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid time: %s", argv[1]); -@@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, - if (p == NULL) { - return (-1); - } -- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); -+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); - - if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[3]) != 0) { - lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid retry: %s", argv[1]); --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0005-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0005-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cf8b9254c8..0000000000 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-kernel/ipmitool/ipmitool/0005-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -From 26e64ca78ae844c5ceedde89531e2924d7d4594c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com> -Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:13:45 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH 5/5] fru, sdr: Fix id_string buffer overflows - -Final part of the fixes for CVE-2020-5208, see -https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp - -9 variants of stack buffer overflow when parsing `id_string` field of -SDR records returned from `CMD_GET_SDR` command. - -SDR record structs have an `id_code` field, and an `id_string` `char` -array. - -The length of `id_string` is calculated as `(id_code & 0x1f) + 1`, -which can be larger than expected 16 characters (if `id_code = 0xff`, -then length will be `(0xff & 0x1f) + 1 = 32`). - -In numerous places, this can cause stack buffer overflow when copying -into fixed buffer of size `17` bytes from this calculated length. - -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/commit/7ccea283dd62a05a320c1921e3d8d71a87772637] -CVE: CVE-2020-5208 - -Signed-off-by: Wenlin Kang <wenlin.kang@windriver.com> ---- - lib/ipmi_fru.c | 2 +- - lib/ipmi_sdr.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- - 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c -index b71ea23..1decea2 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c -@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ ipmi_fru_print(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct sdr_record_fru_locator * fru) - return 0; - - memset(desc, 0, sizeof(desc)); -- memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, fru->id_code & 0x01f); -+ memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, __min(fru->id_code & 0x01f, sizeof(desc))); - desc[fru->id_code & 0x01f] = 0; - printf("FRU Device Description : %s (ID %d)\n", desc, fru->device_id); - -diff --git a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c -index fa7b082..175a86f 100644 ---- a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c -+++ b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c -@@ -2113,7 +2113,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_eventonly(struct ipmi_intf *intf, - return -1; - - memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); -- snprintf(desc, (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", sensor->id_string); -+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, sensor->id_string); - - if (verbose) { - printf("Sensor ID : %s (0x%x)\n", -@@ -2164,7 +2164,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_mc_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, - return -1; - - memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); -- snprintf(desc, (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", mc->id_string); -+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, mc->id_string); - - if (verbose == 0) { - if (csv_output) -@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_generic_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, - char desc[17]; - - memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); -- snprintf(desc, (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", dev->id_string); -+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, dev->id_string); - - if (!verbose) { - if (csv_output) -@@ -2314,7 +2314,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_fru_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, - char desc[17]; - - memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); -- snprintf(desc, (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", fru->id_string); -+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, fru->id_string); - - if (!verbose) { - if (csv_output) -@@ -2518,35 +2518,43 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_name_from_rawentry(struct ipmi_intf *intf,uint16_t id, - - int rc =0; - char desc[17]; -+ const char *id_string; -+ uint8_t id_code; - memset(desc, ' ', sizeof (desc)); - - switch ( type) { - case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_FULL_SENSOR: - record.full = (struct sdr_record_full_sensor *) raw; -- snprintf(desc, (record.full->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", -- (const char *)record.full->id_string); -+ id_code = record.full->id_code; -+ id_string = record.full->id_string; - break; -+ - case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_COMPACT_SENSOR: - record.compact = (struct sdr_record_compact_sensor *) raw ; -- snprintf(desc, (record.compact->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", -- (const char *)record.compact->id_string); -+ id_code = record.compact->id_code; -+ id_string = record.compact->id_string; - break; -+ - case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_EVENTONLY_SENSOR: - record.eventonly = (struct sdr_record_eventonly_sensor *) raw ; -- snprintf(desc, (record.eventonly->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", -- (const char *)record.eventonly->id_string); -- break; -+ id_code = record.eventonly->id_code; -+ id_string = record.eventonly->id_string; -+ break; -+ - case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_MC_DEVICE_LOCATOR: - record.mcloc = (struct sdr_record_mc_locator *) raw ; -- snprintf(desc, (record.mcloc->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", -- (const char *)record.mcloc->id_string); -+ id_code = record.mcloc->id_code; -+ id_string = record.mcloc->id_string; - break; -+ - default: - rc = -1; -- break; -- } -+ } -+ if (!rc) { -+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (id_code & 0x1f) + 1, id_string); -+ } - -- lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc); -+ lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc); - return rc; - } - --- -1.9.1 - |