diff options
author | Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> | 2022-12-20 10:11:16 +0530 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-01-06 17:30:30 +0000 |
commit | 17c3c6ce685ef5b8ff4266154ac830210b234708 (patch) | |
tree | 54b8a9bf95fb1ee770b93daffec2d9f58fc97951 | |
parent | cc8ec63310f9a936371ea1070cb257c926808755 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-17c3c6ce685ef5b8ff4266154ac830210b234708.tar.gz |
grub2: CVE-2022-28735 shim_lock verifier allows non-kernel files to be loaded
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch | 271 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 |
2 files changed, 272 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89b653a8da --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +From 6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com> +Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 15:03:53 +0100 +Subject: kern/efi/sb: Reject non-kernel files in the shim_lock verifier + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53] +CVE: CVE-2022-28735 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> + +We must not allow other verifiers to pass things like the GRUB modules. +Instead of maintaining a blocklist, maintain an allowlist of things +that we do not care about. + +This allowlist really should be made reusable, and shared by the +lockdown verifier, but this is the minimal patch addressing +security concerns where the TPM verifier was able to mark modules +as verified (or the OpenPGP verifier for that matter), when it +should not do so on shim-powered secure boot systems. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28735 + +Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/verify.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 222 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..89c4bb3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c +@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ ++/* ++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader ++ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. ++ * ++ * UEFI Secure Boot related checkings. ++ */ ++ ++#include <grub/efi/efi.h> ++#include <grub/efi/pe32.h> ++#include <grub/efi/sb.h> ++#include <grub/env.h> ++#include <grub/err.h> ++#include <grub/file.h> ++#include <grub/i386/linux.h> ++#include <grub/kernel.h> ++#include <grub/mm.h> ++#include <grub/types.h> ++#include <grub/verify.h> ++ ++static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; ++ ++/* ++ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. ++ * ++ * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel, ++ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot(). ++ */ ++grub_uint8_t ++grub_efi_get_secureboot (void) ++{ ++ static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; ++ grub_efi_status_t status; ++ grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0; ++ grub_size_t size = 0; ++ grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL; ++ grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL; ++ grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL; ++ grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN; ++ const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN"; ++ ++ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid, ++ &size, (void **) &secboot); ++ ++ if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND) ++ { ++ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) ++ goto out; ++ ++ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid, ++ &size, (void **) &setupmode); ++ ++ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) ++ goto out; ++ ++ if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1)) ++ { ++ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the ++ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well ++ * honor that. ++ */ ++ status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &shim_lock_guid, ++ &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr); ++ ++ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ ++ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) ++ { ++ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1) ++ { ++ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED; ++ ++ out: ++ grub_free (moksbstate); ++ grub_free (setupmode); ++ grub_free (secboot); ++ ++ if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED) ++ secureboot_str = "Disabled"; ++ else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED) ++ secureboot_str = "Enabled"; ++ ++ grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str); ++ ++ return secureboot; ++} ++ ++static grub_err_t ++shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ enum grub_file_type type, ++ void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ enum grub_verify_flags *flags) ++{ ++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE; ++ ++ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK) ++ { ++ /* Files we check. */ ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE: ++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK; ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ /* Files that do not affect secureboot state. */ ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOOPBACK: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_INITRD: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_OPENBSD_RAMDISK: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_RAMDISK: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TESTLOAD: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GET_SIZE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CAT: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HEXCAT: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CMP: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PIXMAP: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE_LIST: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_THEME: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GETTEXT_CATALOG: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FS_SEARCH: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOADENV: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SAVEENV: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE: ++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION; ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ /* Other files. */ ++ default: ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("prohibited by secure boot policy")); ++ } ++} ++ ++static grub_err_t ++shim_lock_verifier_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size) ++{ ++ grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0); ++ ++ if (!sl) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("shim_lock protocol not found")); ++ ++ if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature")); ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++ ++struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier = ++ { ++ .name = "shim_lock_verifier", ++ .init = shim_lock_verifier_init, ++ .write = shim_lock_verifier_write ++ }; ++ ++void ++grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void) ++{ ++ struct grub_module_header *header; ++ grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = ++ grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0); ++ ++ /* shim_lock is missing, check if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock. */ ++ if (!sl) ++ { ++ FOR_MODULES (header) ++ { ++ if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK) ++ return; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Secure Boot is off. Do not load shim_lock. */ ++ if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED) ++ return; ++ ++ /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */ ++ grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier); ++ ++ grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y"); ++ grub_env_export ("shim_lock"); ++} +diff --git a/include/grub/verify.h b/include/grub/verify.h +index cd129c3..672ae16 100644 +--- a/include/grub/verify.h ++++ b/include/grub/verify.h +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + + enum grub_verify_flags + { ++ GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE = 0, + GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION = 1, + GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK = 2, + /* Defer verification to another authority. */ +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc index a248af0073..777839d0b6 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2022-28733.patch \ file://CVE-2022-28734.patch \ file://CVE-2022-28736.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-28735.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea" |