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authorRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2019-01-28 13:57:44 +0000
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2019-01-28 17:22:25 +0000
commitbc79395e2fcb886f224a4ad837fd93c779d2c53d (patch)
tree2fdc65d98203dc934cfec4cb26018c390534b7f5 /meta/recipes-core
parenta8ab78824575bdfcdb9efe89378951d734c1cfa9 (diff)
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systemd: Update recent CVE patches
* Added CVE tag, Upstream-Status tag and Sign-off-by tags. * Removed the verification of the entry length in the header * Squashed CVE-2018-16865 patches into one * CVE-2018-16866 patch now taken from systemd-stable and includes an additional heap buffer overflow fix. Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-core')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch6
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch56
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch139
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch49
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch84
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch77
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch84
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb6
8 files changed, 195 insertions, 306 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
index c3009545b1..c2f78be39e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 9cb07e7d82c7c4f28bbaa1478e1387e8ea3d03dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
Patch backported from systemd master at
084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16864
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
---
src/basic/io-util.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/basic/io-util.h | 2 ++
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50a01efe8f..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 4566aaf97f5b4143b930d75628f3abc905249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
-
-We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
-our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
-small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
-
-CVE-2018-16865
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
-
-What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
-description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
-many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
----
- src/basic/journal-importer.h | 3 +++
- src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
---- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-+++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
- #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
- #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
-
-+/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
-+#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
-+
- struct iovec_wrapper {
- struct iovec *iovec;
- size_t size_bytes;
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
-index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
- }
-
- /* A property follows */
-+ if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
-+ log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
-+ r = 1;
-+ goto finish;
-+ }
-
- /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
- if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
---
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae9ef5de56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 7cad044b72406cbadf048da432c29afea74c3c10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields
+
+The fix for CVE-2018-16865 is plucked from two commits that have
+been pushed to systemd master.
+
+journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
+
+We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
+our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
+small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
+
+CVE-2018-16865
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
+
+What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
+description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
+many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
+
+journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a message
+
+Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
+reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
+
+This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
+part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
+(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074.
+with the changes applied by 7fdb237f5473cb8fc2129e57e8a0039526dcb4fd
+removed.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16865
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
+---
+ src/basic/journal-importer.c | 5 ++++-
+ src/basic/journal-importer.h | 3 +++
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 7 ++++++-
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c | 5 ++++-
+ src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
+ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
+ };
+
+ static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
++ if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
++ return -E2BIG;
++
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
+ return log_oom();
+
+@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
+ imp->scanned = imp->filled;
+ if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) {
+ log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX);
+- return -E2BIG;
++ return -ENOBUFS;
+ }
+
+ if (imp->passive_fd)
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
+ #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
+
++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
++
+ struct iovec_wrapper {
+ struct iovec *iovec;
+ size_t size_bytes;
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+index 8fda9d1499..3a01fef646 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+@@ -212,7 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
+ break;
+ else if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
+- if (r == -E2BIG)
++ if (r == -ENOBUFS)
++ return mhd_respondf(connection,
++ r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
++ "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
++ DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
++ else if (r == -E2BIG)
+ return mhd_respondf(connection,
+ r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
+ "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
+ log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (r == -E2BIG) {
+- log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped");
++ log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
++ return 1;
++ } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
++ log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
+ return 1;
+ } else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
+ return 0;
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
+ }
+
+ /* A property follows */
++ if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
++ log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
++ r = 1;
++ goto finish;
++ }
+
+ /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3925a4abbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From ebd06c37d4311db9851f4d3fdd023de3dd590de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 14:53:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix out-of-bounds read CVE-2018-16866
+
+The original code didn't account for the fact that strchr() would match on the
+'\0' character, making it read past the end of the buffer if no non-whitespace
+character was present.
+
+This bug was introduced in commit ec5ff4445cca6a which was first released in
+systemd v221 and later fixed in commit 8595102d3ddde6 which was released in
+v240, so versions in the range [v221, v240) are affected.
+
+Patch backported from systemd-stable at f005e73d3723d62a39be661931fcb6347119b52b
+also includes a change from systemd master which removes a heap buffer overflow
+a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16866
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
+---
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 9dea116722..809b318c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+ e = l;
+ l--;
+
+- if (p[l-1] == ']') {
++ if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
+ size_t k = l-1;
+
+ for (;;) {
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+ if (t)
+ *identifier = t;
+
+- if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
++ if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
+ e++;
+ *buf = p + e;
+ return e;
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 104945cc25..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From 4183ec3a135663128834ca8b35d50a60999343a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 10:48:10 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a
- message
-
-Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
-reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
-(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074.
----
- src/basic/journal-importer.c | 5 ++++-
- src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 10 ++++++----
- src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c | 5 ++++-
- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644
---- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-+++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
- };
-
- static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
-+ if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
-+ return -E2BIG;
-+
- if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
- return log_oom();
-
-@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
- imp->scanned = imp->filled;
- if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) {
- log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX);
-- return -E2BIG;
-+ return -ENOBUFS;
- }
-
- if (imp->passive_fd)
-diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-index 8fda9d1499..f52618fb7b 100644
---- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-@@ -212,10 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
- break;
- else if (r < 0) {
- log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
-- if (r == -E2BIG)
-- return mhd_respondf(connection,
-- r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
-- "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
-+ if (r == -ENOBUFS)
-+ log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
-+ DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
-+ else if (r == -E2BIG)
-+ log_warning_errno(r, "Entry with more fields than the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
-+ ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX, connection);
- else
- return mhd_respondf(connection,
- r, MHD_HTTP_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
-diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644
---- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
- log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
- return 0;
- } else if (r == -E2BIG) {
-- log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped");
-+ log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
-+ return 1;
-+ } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
-+ log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
- return 1;
- } else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
- return 0;
---
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d4df0e12fd..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From 8ccebb04e07628f7fe10131d6cd4f19d6a0d8f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 15:06:36 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix syslog_parse_identifier()
-
-Fixes #9829.
-
-An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it
-parses log messages that terminate with a colon ':'. A local attacker
-can use this flaw to disclose process memory data.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the first
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866.
----
- src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 6 +++---
- src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-index 9dea116722..97711ac7a3 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
- e = l;
- l--;
-
-- if (p[l-1] == ']') {
-+ if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
- size_t k = l-1;
-
- for (;;) {
-@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
- if (t)
- *identifier = t;
-
-- if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
-- e++;
-+ e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
-+
- *buf = p + e;
- return e;
- }
-diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-index 9ba86f6c8a..05f759817e 100644
---- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
- #include "macro.h"
- #include "string-util.h"
-
--static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
-- const char *ident, const char*pid, int ret) {
-+static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
-+ const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
- const char *buf = str;
- _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
- int ret2;
-@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
- int main(void) {
- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(": ", "", NULL, 3);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
-
- return 0;
- }
---
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa2c01034b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From c3a7da1bbb6d2df8ab7ea1c7ce34ded37a21959f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 11:07:54 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] journal: do not remove multiple spaces after identifier in
- syslog message
-
-Single space is used as separator.
-C.f. discussions in #156.
-
-Fixes #9839 introduced by a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421.
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866
----
- src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 4 +++-
- src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-index 97711ac7a3..e0b55cc566 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-@@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
- if (t)
- *identifier = t;
-
-- e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
-+ /* Single space is used as separator */
-+ if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
-+ e++;
-
- *buf = p + e;
- return e;
-diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-index 05f759817e..7294cde032 100644
---- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
- #include "string-util.h"
-
- static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
-- const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
-+ const char *ident, const char *pid, const char *rest, int ret) {
- const char *buf = str;
- _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
- int ret2;
-@@ -16,18 +16,22 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
- assert_se(ret == ret2);
- assert_se(ident == ident2 || streq_ptr(ident, ident2));
- assert_se(pid == pid2 || streq_ptr(pid, pid2));
-+ assert_se(streq(buf, rest));
- }
-
- int main(void) {
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier(": ", "", NULL, 3);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-- test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", "xxx", 11);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, "xxx", 6);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, " xxx", 6);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, "pidu xxx", 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(" pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, " pidu xxx", 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("", NULL, NULL, "", 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(" ", NULL, NULL, " ", 0);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, "", 1);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier(": ", "", NULL, " ", 2);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, "", 5);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, "", 6);
-+ test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, "pidu : ", 0);
-
- return 0;
- }
---
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
index 7efc1e5828..f843f588bd 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
@@ -39,10 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \
file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \
file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
- file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
- file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
- file://0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch \
- file://0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch \
+ file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch \
+ file://0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \
"
# patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl