From 1bbaf8d198b121a2a6f033350d1de3baa0a1163c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Changqing Li Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:59:44 +0800 Subject: qemu: fix CVE-2018-17958/17962/17963 Signed-off-by: Changqing Li Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch | 52 ++++++++++++++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17962.patch | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17963.patch | 51 ++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 176 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17962.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17963.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af40ff275a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17958.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 06e88ca78d056ea4de885e3a1496805179dc47bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Changqing Li +Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:33:04 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive + +In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts +from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater +INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass +the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of +for both buf and buf1. + +Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. + +CC: address@hidden +Reported-by: Daniel Shapira +Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin +Signed-off-by: Jason Wang + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03273.html] + +CVE: CVE-2018-17958 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li +--- + hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c +index 07d79e3..869518e 100644 +--- a/hw/net/ne2000.c ++++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c +@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s) + ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) + { + NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc); +- int size = size_; ++ size_t size = size_; + uint8_t *p; + unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx; + uint8_t buf1[60]; +@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) + { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; + + #if defined(DEBUG_NE2000) +- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size); ++ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size); + #endif + + if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s)) +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17962.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17962.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88bfd811ea --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17962.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 20abe443ad9464b18ac494f71f7d53f19ee3748f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Changqing Li +Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:38:08 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] rtl8139: fix possible out of bound access + +In rtl8139_do_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts +from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater +INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass +the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of +for both buf and buf1. + +Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. + +CC: address@hidden +Reported-by: Daniel Shapira +Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin +Signed-off-by: Jason Wang + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03269.html] + +CVE: CVE-2018-17962 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li +--- + hw/net/rtl8139.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c +index 46daa16..2342a09 100644 +--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c ++++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c +@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t + RTL8139State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc); + PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s); + /* size is the length of the buffer passed to the driver */ +- int size = size_; ++ size_t size = size_; + const uint8_t *dot1q_buf = NULL; + + uint32_t packet_header = 0; +@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t + static const uint8_t broadcast_macaddr[6] = + { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; + +- DPRINTF(">>> received len=%d\n", size); ++ DPRINTF(">>> received len=%zu\n", size); + + /* test if board clock is stopped */ + if (!s->clock_enabled) +@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t + + if (size+4 > rx_space) + { +- DPRINTF("C+ Rx mode : descriptor %d size %d received %d + 4\n", ++ DPRINTF("C+ Rx mode : descriptor %d size %d received %zu + 4\n", + descriptor, rx_space, size); + + s->IntrStatus |= RxOverflow; +@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t + if (avail != 0 && RX_ALIGN(size + 8) >= avail) + { + DPRINTF("rx overflow: rx buffer length %d head 0x%04x " +- "read 0x%04x === available 0x%04x need 0x%04x\n", ++ "read 0x%04x === available 0x%04x need 0x%04zx\n", + s->RxBufferSize, s->RxBufAddr, s->RxBufPtr, avail, size + 8); + + s->IntrStatus |= RxOverflow; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17963.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17963.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..054cdc8674 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2018-17963.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From e5ff72a8005dd1d9c0f63f8a9cc4298df5bb7551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Changqing Li +Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:39:46 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix possible buffer overflow + +In pcnet_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts from +size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater +INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass +the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access +for both buf and buf1. + +Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t. + +CC: address@hidden +Reported-by: Daniel Shapira +Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin +Signed-off-by: Jason Wang + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03268.html] + +CVE: CVE-2018-17963 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li +--- + hw/net/pcnet.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c +index 0c44554..d9ba04b 100644 +--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c ++++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c +@@ -988,14 +988,14 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) + uint8_t buf1[60]; + int remaining; + int crc_err = 0; +- int size = size_; ++ size_t size = size_; + + if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size || + (CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) { + return -1; + } + #ifdef PCNET_DEBUG +- printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size); ++ printf("pcnet_receive size=%zu\n", size); + #endif + + /* if too small buffer, then expand it */ +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb index 4569caec2f..776548b05a 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_3.0.0.bb @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0010-linux-user-Fix-webkitgtk-hangs-on-32-bit-x86-target.patch \ file://0011-Revert-linux-user-fix-mmap-munmap-mprotect-mremap-sh.patch \ file://CVE-2018-15746.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-17958.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-17962.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-17963.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" -- cgit 1.2.3-korg