summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-connectivity
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRoss Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>2019-03-14 20:34:04 +0000
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2019-03-18 22:59:59 +0000
commit0f65b1192067a101d9a035f0ef26bae0ea13afeb (patch)
treefddca3300b02298ba04fff2c5b243b52a11c941a /meta/recipes-connectivity
parent344090a549284d0a1af065ff4cc3038bff8ecfea (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-0f65b1192067a101d9a035f0ef26bae0ea13afeb.tar.gz
openembedded-core-0f65b1192067a101d9a035f0ef26bae0ea13afeb.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-0f65b1192067a101d9a035f0ef26bae0ea13afeb.zip
openssl: fix CVE-2019-1543
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch69
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb1
2 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59a92f06e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3]
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
+
+ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
+every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
+should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
+front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
+also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
+only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
+ignored.
+
+It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
+Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
+confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
+default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
+the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
+nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
+reused nonce.
+
+Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
+integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
+integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
+affected.
+
+Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
+because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
+applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
+length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
+
+CVE-2019-1543
+
+Fixes #8345
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
+---
+ crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
+index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct {
+
+ #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+
++#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12
++
+ static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+ const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
+@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
++ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN)
+ return 0;
+ actx->nonce_len = arg;
+ return 1;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
index 4a626a4fcd..5c5e291c1b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \
file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
file://afalg.patch \
+ file://CVE-2019-1543.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \