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authorRobert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>2016-04-05 23:58:40 -0700
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2016-04-06 10:31:41 +0100
commit8bed58160316c84bb4c4e866058f695c4402b95e (patch)
treefa57835556197ea5b6e8539e127bd73cbe72e581 /meta/recipes-devtools/rpm
parent4438a1125bb15ed19c78833f4d8a5b108cd91d30 (diff)
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rpm: remove two unused patch
They are already in the source: rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/rpm')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch110
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch44
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2691f6da8..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From 08105acda1da63d32fbb18596a3d6c3e0aa106d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 14:36:56 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rpm: CVE-2013-6435
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2013-6435
-
-Reference:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2013-6435
-
-Description:
-It was found that RPM wrote file contents to the target installation
-directory under a temporary name, and verified its cryptographic signature
-only after the temporary file has been written completely. Under certain
-conditions, the system interprets the unverified temporary file contents
-and extracts commands from it. This could allow an attacker to modify
-signed RPM files in such a way that they would execute code chosen
-by the attacker during package installation.
-
-Original Patch:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=956207
-
-Signed-off-by: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
----
- lib/fsm.c | 2 +-
- rpmio/rpmio.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
-index 1ee7e67..094eb1d 100644
---- a/lib/fsm.c
-+++ b/lib/fsm.c
-@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int expandRegular(FSM_t fsm, rpmpsm psm, rpmcpio_t archive, int nodigest)
- {
- FD_t wfd = NULL;
- const struct stat * st = &fsm->sb;
-- rpm_loff_t left = st->st_size;
-+ rpm_loff_t left = rpmfiFSizeIndex(fsmGetFi(fsm), fsm->ix);
- const unsigned char * fidigest = NULL;
- pgpHashAlgo digestalgo = 0;
- int rc = 0;
-diff --git a/rpmio/rpmio.c b/rpmio/rpmio.c
-index cd223e8..0b12e31 100644
---- a/rpmio/rpmio.c
-+++ b/rpmio/rpmio.c
-@@ -1309,15 +1309,19 @@ int Fclose(FD_t fd)
- * - bzopen: [1-9] is block size (modulo 100K)
- * - bzopen: 's' is smallmode
- * - HACK: '.' terminates, rest is type of I/O
-+ * - 'U' sets *mode to zero (no permissions) instead of 0666
- */
- static void cvtfmode (const char *m,
- char *stdio, size_t nstdio,
- char *other, size_t nother,
-- const char **end, int * f)
-+ const char **end, int *f, mode_t *mode)
- {
- int flags = 0;
- char c;
-
-+ if (mode)
-+ *mode = 0666;
-+
- switch (*m) {
- case 'a':
- flags |= O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND;
-@@ -1357,6 +1361,10 @@ static void cvtfmode (const char *m,
- if (--nstdio > 0) *stdio++ = c;
- continue;
- break;
-+ case 'U':
-+ if (mode)
-+ *mode = 0;
-+ break;
- default:
- if (--nother > 0) *other++ = c;
- continue;
-@@ -1385,7 +1393,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "*** Fdopen(%p,%s) %s\n", fd, fmode, fdbg(fd));
- if (fd == NULL || fmode == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
-- cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, NULL);
-+ cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, NULL,
-+ NULL);
- if (stdio[0] == '\0')
- return NULL;
- zstdio[0] = '\0';
-@@ -1436,7 +1445,7 @@ FD_t Fopen(const char *path, const char *fmode)
- {
- char stdio[20], other[20];
- const char *end = NULL;
-- mode_t perms = 0666;
-+ mode_t perms;
- int flags = 0;
- FD_t fd;
-
-@@ -1444,7 +1453,8 @@ FD_t Fopen(const char *path, const char *fmode)
- return NULL;
-
- stdio[0] = '\0';
-- cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, &flags);
-+ cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, &flags,
-+ &perms);
- if (stdio[0] == '\0')
- return NULL;
-
---
-1.8.4.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 985f150f0f..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 71c812edf1431a9967bd99ba6ffa6ab89eb7ec7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 12:56:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] rpm: CVE-2014-8118
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2014-8118
-
-Reference:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168715
-
-Description:
-It was found that RPM could encounter an integer overflow,
-leading to a stack-based overflow, while parsing a crafted
-CPIO header in the payload section of an RPM file. This could
-allow an attacker to modify signed RPM files in such a way that
-they would execute code chosen by the attacker during package
-installation.
-
-Original Patch:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=962159
-
-Signed-off-by: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
----
- lib/cpio.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/cpio.c b/lib/cpio.c
-index 382eeb6..74ddd9c 100644
---- a/lib/cpio.c
-+++ b/lib/cpio.c
-@@ -296,6 +296,9 @@ int rpmcpioHeaderRead(rpmcpio_t cpio, char ** path, struct stat * st)
- st->st_rdev = makedev(major, minor);
-
- GET_NUM_FIELD(hdr.namesize, nameSize);
-+ if (nameSize <= 0 || nameSize > 4096) {
-+ return CPIOERR_BAD_HEADER;
-+ }
-
- *path = xmalloc(nameSize + 1);
- read = Fread(*path, nameSize, 1, cpio->fd);
---
-1.8.4.5
-