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authorLeonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>2015-06-10 14:58:38 +0000
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2015-06-23 11:38:17 +0100
commit6bf846ed5ccd1a4d01b36630708b2b9aa9e69ed5 (patch)
treed9a262ce3ec9028ab524c8a918444e1dd263930e /meta/recipes-devtools
parent0a1f924157cb75d0f67cf534762c89dc8656d352 (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-6bf846ed5ccd1a4d01b36630708b2b9aa9e69ed5.tar.gz
openembedded-core-6bf846ed5ccd1a4d01b36630708b2b9aa9e69ed5.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-6bf846ed5ccd1a4d01b36630708b2b9aa9e69ed5.zip
rpm: Fix CVE-2013-6435
Backport to fix CVE-2013-6435. Description on [1] and original patch taken from [2]. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2013-6435 [2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=956207 [YOCTO #7181] Signed-off-by: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch109
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.11.2.bb1
2 files changed, 110 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b107e8f047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm/rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 08105acda1da63d32fbb18596a3d6c3e0aa106d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 14:36:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rpm: CVE-2013-6435
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Reference:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2013-6435
+
+Description:
+It was found that RPM wrote file contents to the target installation
+directory under a temporary name, and verified its cryptographic signature
+only after the temporary file has been written completely. Under certain
+conditions, the system interprets the unverified temporary file contents
+and extracts commands from it. This could allow an attacker to modify
+signed RPM files in such a way that they would execute code chosen
+by the attacker during package installation.
+
+Original Patch:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=956207
+
+Signed-off-by: Leonardo Sandoval <leonardo.sandoval.gonzalez@linux.intel.com>
+---
+ lib/fsm.c | 2 +-
+ rpmio/rpmio.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
+index 1ee7e67..094eb1d 100644
+--- a/lib/fsm.c
++++ b/lib/fsm.c
+@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ static int expandRegular(FSM_t fsm, rpmpsm psm, rpmcpio_t archive, int nodigest)
+ {
+ FD_t wfd = NULL;
+ const struct stat * st = &fsm->sb;
+- rpm_loff_t left = st->st_size;
++ rpm_loff_t left = rpmfiFSizeIndex(fsmGetFi(fsm), fsm->ix);
+ const unsigned char * fidigest = NULL;
+ pgpHashAlgo digestalgo = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+diff --git a/rpmio/rpmio.c b/rpmio/rpmio.c
+index cd223e8..0b12e31 100644
+--- a/rpmio/rpmio.c
++++ b/rpmio/rpmio.c
+@@ -1309,15 +1309,19 @@ int Fclose(FD_t fd)
+ * - bzopen: [1-9] is block size (modulo 100K)
+ * - bzopen: 's' is smallmode
+ * - HACK: '.' terminates, rest is type of I/O
++ * - 'U' sets *mode to zero (no permissions) instead of 0666
+ */
+ static void cvtfmode (const char *m,
+ char *stdio, size_t nstdio,
+ char *other, size_t nother,
+- const char **end, int * f)
++ const char **end, int *f, mode_t *mode)
+ {
+ int flags = 0;
+ char c;
+
++ if (mode)
++ *mode = 0666;
++
+ switch (*m) {
+ case 'a':
+ flags |= O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND;
+@@ -1357,6 +1361,10 @@ static void cvtfmode (const char *m,
+ if (--nstdio > 0) *stdio++ = c;
+ continue;
+ break;
++ case 'U':
++ if (mode)
++ *mode = 0;
++ break;
+ default:
+ if (--nother > 0) *other++ = c;
+ continue;
+@@ -1385,7 +1393,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "*** Fdopen(%p,%s) %s\n", fd, fmode, fdbg(fd));
+ if (fd == NULL || fmode == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+- cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, NULL);
++ cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, NULL,
++ NULL);
+ if (stdio[0] == '\0')
+ return NULL;
+ zstdio[0] = '\0';
+@@ -1436,7 +1445,7 @@ FD_t Fopen(const char *path, const char *fmode)
+ {
+ char stdio[20], other[20];
+ const char *end = NULL;
+- mode_t perms = 0666;
++ mode_t perms;
+ int flags = 0;
+ FD_t fd;
+
+@@ -1444,7 +1453,8 @@ FD_t Fopen(const char *path, const char *fmode)
+ return NULL;
+
+ stdio[0] = '\0';
+- cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, &flags);
++ cvtfmode(fmode, stdio, sizeof(stdio), other, sizeof(other), &end, &flags,
++ &perms);
+ if (stdio[0] == '\0')
+ return NULL;
+
+--
+1.8.4.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.11.2.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.11.2.bb
index 7c402b6cfb..df9aafbaab 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.11.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.11.2.bb
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://rpm.org/releases/rpm-4.11.x/${BP}.tar.bz2 \
file://rpm-scriptetexechelp.patch \
file://pythondeps.sh \
file://rpm-CVE-2014-8118.patch \
+ file://rpm-CVE-2013-6435.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "876ac9948a88367054f8ddb5c0e87173"