summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorHongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>2017-09-25 04:07:19 -0400
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2017-09-25 14:19:02 +0100
commit3b827eff306c484d78d61b259cd5d4eef8df381c (patch)
tree98c4c9992dafb0844f2e6e668ba77bdeffb837f9 /meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt
parentb848c3cb495905605283c57c79f2ed8ca17758db (diff)
downloadopenembedded-core-3b827eff306c484d78d61b259cd5d4eef8df381c.tar.gz
openembedded-core-3b827eff306c484d78d61b259cd5d4eef8df381c.tar.bz2
openembedded-core-3b827eff306c484d78d61b259cd5d4eef8df381c.zip
libgcrypt: fix CVE-2017-0379
Backport the fix from https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git; a=commit;h=bf76acbf0da6b0f245e491bec12c0f0a1b5be7c9 Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch158
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb1
2 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66fdd740b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+From ef570e3d2773c12126e7d3fcdc4db9ef80a5e214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 18:13:28 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Add input validation for X25519.
+
+* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_decrypt_raw): Add input validation.
+* mpi/ec.c (ec_p_init): Use scratch buffer for bad points.
+(_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point): New.
+
+--
+
+Following is the paper describing the attack:
+
+ May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack
+ on Real-World Applications of Curve25519
+ by Daniel Genkin, Luke Valenta, and Yuval Yarom
+
+In the current implementation, we do output checking and it results an
+error for those bad points. However, when attacked, the computation
+will done with leak of private key, even it will results errors. To
+mitigate leak, we added input validation.
+
+Note that we only list bad points with MSB=0. By X25519, MSB is
+always cleared.
+
+In future, we should implement constant-time field computation. Then,
+this input validation could be removed, if performance is important
+and we are sure for no leak.
+
+CVE-id: CVE-2017-0379
+Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2017-0379
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ cipher/ecc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ mpi/ec.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/mpi.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
+index e25bf09..4e3e5b1 100644
+--- a/cipher/ecc.c
++++ b/cipher/ecc.c
+@@ -1628,9 +1628,22 @@ ecc_decrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
+ if (DBG_CIPHER)
+ log_printpnt ("ecc_decrypt kG", &kG, NULL);
+
+- if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)
++ if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))
++ {
+ /* For X25519, by its definition, validation should not be done. */
+- && !_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
++ /* (Instead, we do output check.)
++ *
++ * However, to mitigate secret key leak from our implementation,
++ * we also do input validation here. For constant-time
++ * implementation, we can remove this input validation.
++ */
++ if (_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (&kG, ec))
++ {
++ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
++ goto leave;
++ }
++ }
++ else if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec))
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
+ goto leave;
+diff --git a/mpi/ec.c b/mpi/ec.c
+index a0f7357..4c16603 100644
+--- a/mpi/ec.c
++++ b/mpi/ec.c
+@@ -396,6 +396,29 @@ ec_get_two_inv_p (mpi_ec_t ec)
+ }
+
+
++static const char *curve25519_bad_points[] = {
++ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
++ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
++ "0x00b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebe0",
++ "0x57119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c5f",
++ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffec",
++ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed",
++ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffee",
++ NULL
++};
++
++static gcry_mpi_t
++scanval (const char *string)
++{
++ gpg_err_code_t rc;
++ gcry_mpi_t val;
++
++ rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&val, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, string, 0, NULL);
++ if (rc)
++ log_fatal ("scanning ECC parameter failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
++ return val;
++}
++
+
+ /* This function initialized a context for elliptic curve based on the
+ field GF(p). P is the prime specifying this field, A is the first
+@@ -434,9 +457,17 @@ ec_p_init (mpi_ec_t ctx, enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model,
+
+ _gcry_mpi_ec_get_reset (ctx);
+
+- /* Allocate scratch variables. */
+- for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
+- ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
++ if (model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
++ {
++ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch) && curve25519_bad_points[i]; i++)
++ ctx->t.scratch[i] = scanval (curve25519_bad_points[i]);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ /* Allocate scratch variables. */
++ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++)
++ ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p);
++ }
+
+ /* Prepare for fast reduction. */
+ /* FIXME: need a test for NIST values. However it does not gain us
+@@ -1572,3 +1603,17 @@ _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
+
+ return res;
+ }
++
++
++int
++_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx)
++{
++ int i;
++ gcry_mpi_t x_bad;
++
++ for (i = 0; (x_bad = ctx->t.scratch[i]); i++)
++ if (!mpi_cmp (point->x, x_bad))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
+diff --git a/src/mpi.h b/src/mpi.h
+index b5385b5..aeba7f8 100644
+--- a/src/mpi.h
++++ b/src/mpi.h
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ void _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (mpi_point_t result,
+ gcry_mpi_t scalar, mpi_point_t point,
+ mpi_ec_t ctx);
+ int _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
++int _gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx);
+
+ gcry_mpi_t _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ectx);
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
index 1797d9584d..fb004d9ceb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0003-tests-bench-slope.c-workaround-ICE-failure-on-mips-w.patch \
file://0002-libgcrypt-fix-building-error-with-O2-in-sysroot-path.patch \
file://0004-tests-Makefile.am-fix-undefined-reference-to-pthread.patch \
+ file://0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "110ce4352f9ea6f560bdc6c5644ae93c"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f6e470b7f2d3a703e8747f05a8c19d9e10e26ebf2d5f3d71ff75a40f504e12ee"