diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch | 158 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.1.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb) | 8 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 163 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 66fdd740b5..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/files/0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -From ef570e3d2773c12126e7d3fcdc4db9ef80a5e214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> -Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 18:13:28 +0900 -Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Add input validation for X25519. - -* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_decrypt_raw): Add input validation. -* mpi/ec.c (ec_p_init): Use scratch buffer for bad points. -(_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point): New. - --- - -Following is the paper describing the attack: - - May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack - on Real-World Applications of Curve25519 - by Daniel Genkin, Luke Valenta, and Yuval Yarom - -In the current implementation, we do output checking and it results an -error for those bad points. However, when attacked, the computation -will done with leak of private key, even it will results errors. To -mitigate leak, we added input validation. - -Note that we only list bad points with MSB=0. By X25519, MSB is -always cleared. - -In future, we should implement constant-time field computation. Then, -this input validation could be removed, if performance is important -and we are sure for no leak. - -CVE-id: CVE-2017-0379 -Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2017-0379 -Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com> ---- - cipher/ecc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- - mpi/ec.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - src/mpi.h | 1 + - 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c -index e25bf09..4e3e5b1 100644 ---- a/cipher/ecc.c -+++ b/cipher/ecc.c -@@ -1628,9 +1628,22 @@ ecc_decrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_plain, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms) - if (DBG_CIPHER) - log_printpnt ("ecc_decrypt kG", &kG, NULL); - -- if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK) -+ if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) -+ { - /* For X25519, by its definition, validation should not be done. */ -- && !_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec)) -+ /* (Instead, we do output check.) -+ * -+ * However, to mitigate secret key leak from our implementation, -+ * we also do input validation here. For constant-time -+ * implementation, we can remove this input validation. -+ */ -+ if (_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (&kG, ec)) -+ { -+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA; -+ goto leave; -+ } -+ } -+ else if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&kG, ec)) - { - rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA; - goto leave; -diff --git a/mpi/ec.c b/mpi/ec.c -index a0f7357..4c16603 100644 ---- a/mpi/ec.c -+++ b/mpi/ec.c -@@ -396,6 +396,29 @@ ec_get_two_inv_p (mpi_ec_t ec) - } - - -+static const char *curve25519_bad_points[] = { -+ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", -+ "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", -+ "0x00b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebe0", -+ "0x57119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c5f", -+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffec", -+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed", -+ "0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffee", -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+static gcry_mpi_t -+scanval (const char *string) -+{ -+ gpg_err_code_t rc; -+ gcry_mpi_t val; -+ -+ rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&val, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, string, 0, NULL); -+ if (rc) -+ log_fatal ("scanning ECC parameter failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); -+ return val; -+} -+ - - /* This function initialized a context for elliptic curve based on the - field GF(p). P is the prime specifying this field, A is the first -@@ -434,9 +457,17 @@ ec_p_init (mpi_ec_t ctx, enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model, - - _gcry_mpi_ec_get_reset (ctx); - -- /* Allocate scratch variables. */ -- for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++) -- ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p); -+ if (model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY) -+ { -+ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch) && curve25519_bad_points[i]; i++) -+ ctx->t.scratch[i] = scanval (curve25519_bad_points[i]); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* Allocate scratch variables. */ -+ for (i=0; i< DIM(ctx->t.scratch); i++) -+ ctx->t.scratch[i] = mpi_alloc_like (ctx->p); -+ } - - /* Prepare for fast reduction. */ - /* FIXME: need a test for NIST values. However it does not gain us -@@ -1572,3 +1603,17 @@ _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx) - - return res; - } -+ -+ -+int -+_gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx) -+{ -+ int i; -+ gcry_mpi_t x_bad; -+ -+ for (i = 0; (x_bad = ctx->t.scratch[i]); i++) -+ if (!mpi_cmp (point->x, x_bad)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -diff --git a/src/mpi.h b/src/mpi.h -index b5385b5..aeba7f8 100644 ---- a/src/mpi.h -+++ b/src/mpi.h -@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ void _gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (mpi_point_t result, - gcry_mpi_t scalar, mpi_point_t point, - mpi_ec_t ctx); - int _gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx); -+int _gcry_mpi_ec_bad_point (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ctx); - - gcry_mpi_t _gcry_mpi_ec_ec2os (gcry_mpi_point_t point, mpi_ec_t ectx); - --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.1.bb index 02982f03c6..5bd815ae55 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.0.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-support/libgcrypt/libgcrypt_1.8.1.bb @@ -15,16 +15,14 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=94d55d512a9ba36caa9b7df079bae19f \ DEPENDS = "libgpg-error" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://gnupg.org/download/index.html" -SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.gz \ +SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0001-Add-and-use-pkg-config-for-libgcrypt-instead-of-conf.patch \ file://0003-tests-bench-slope.c-workaround-ICE-failure-on-mips-w.patch \ file://0002-libgcrypt-fix-building-error-with-O2-in-sysroot-path.patch \ file://0004-tests-Makefile.am-fix-undefined-reference-to-pthread.patch \ - file://0005-ecc-Add-input-validation-for-X25519.patch \ - file://0006-Fix-building-AArch32-CE-implementations-when-target-.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "110ce4352f9ea6f560bdc6c5644ae93c" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f6e470b7f2d3a703e8747f05a8c19d9e10e26ebf2d5f3d71ff75a40f504e12ee" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b21817f9d850064d2177285f1073ec55" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7a2875f8b1ae0301732e878c0cca2c9664ff09ef71408f085c50e332656a78b3" BINCONFIG = "${bindir}/libgcrypt-config" |