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2014-06-09openssl: fix for CVE-2010-5298Yue Tao
Race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function in s3_pkt.c in OpenSSL through 1.0.1g, when SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, allows remote attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and parsing error) via an SSL connection in a multithreaded environment. http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5298 (From OE-Core master rev: 751f81ed8dc488c500837aeb3eb41ebf3237e10b) Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Roy Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-06-09openssl: fix CVE-2014-3470Paul Eggleton
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470) OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-06-09openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224Paul Eggleton
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224) An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and modify traffic from the attacked client and server. The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and* server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-06-09openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221Paul Eggleton
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221) By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-06-09openssl: use upstream fix for CVE-2014-0198Paul Eggleton
This replaces the fix for CVE-2014-0198 with one borrowed from Fedora, which is the same as the patch which was actually applied upstream for the issue, i.e.: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b107586c0c3447ea22dba8698ebbcd81bb29d48c Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-06-09openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195Paul Eggleton
From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195) A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
2014-05-12openssl: fix CVE-2014-0198Maxin B. John
A null pointer dereference bug was discovered in do_ssl3_write(). An attacker could possibly use this to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service. https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2014-0198 Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-11openssl: bump PRPaul Eggleton
We don't normally do this, but with the recent CVE fixes (most importantly the one for the serious CVE-2014-0160 vulnerability) I am bumping PR explicitly to make it a bit more obvious that the patch has been applied. Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-09openssl: backport fix for CVE-2014-0160Paul Eggleton
Fixes the "heartbleed" TLS vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160). More information here: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0160 Patch borrowed from Debian; this is just a tweaked version of the upstream commit (without patching the CHANGES file which otherwise would fail to apply on top of this version). Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-09Security Advisory - openssl - CVE-2013-6449Yue Tao
The ssl_get_algorithm2 function in ssl/s3_lib.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.2 obtains a certain version number from an incorrect data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via crafted traffic from a TLS 1.2 client. (From OE-Core master rev: 3e0ac7357a962e3ef6595d21ec4843b078a764dd) Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-09Security Advisory - openssl - CVE-2013-6450Yue Tao
The DTLS retransmission implementation in OpenSSL through 0.9.8y and 1.x through 1.0.1e does not properly maintain data structures for digest and encryption contexts, which might allow man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger the use of a different context by interfering with packet delivery, related to ssl/d1_both.c and ssl/t1_enc.c. (From OE-Core master rev: 94352e694cd828aa84abd846149712535f48ab0f) Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-09Security Advisory - openssl - CVE-2013-4353Yue Tao
The ssl3_take_mac function in ssl/s3_both.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1f allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted Next Protocol Negotiation record in a TLS handshake. (From OE-Core master rev: 35ccce7002188c8270d2fead35f9763b22776877) Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-04openssl: Add fix for cipher des-ede3-cfb1Muhammad Shakeel
Add patch file for one of the ciphers used in openssl, namely the cipher des-ede3-cfb1. Details of the bug, without this patch, can be found here. http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2867 (From OE-Core master rev: ed61c28b9af2f11f46488332b80752b734a3cdeb) Signed-off-by: Muhammad Shakeel <muhammad_shakeel@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-07-04openssl: fix documentation build errors with Perl 5.18 pod2manJonathan Liu
(From OE-Core master rev: 8792b7fb4ef8d66336d52de7e81efbb818e16b08) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-06-10openssl: Disable parallel makePhil Blundell
Otherwise you get errors like: | ../libcrypto.so: file not recognized: File truncated | collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status | make[2]: *** [link_o.gnu] Error 1 (From OE-Core master rev: 61c21a0f7a2041446a82b76ee3658fda5dfbff1d) Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-04-09openssl: Upgrade to v1.0.1eRadu Moisan
Dropped obolete patches and pulled updates for debian patches. Addresses CVEs: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-2686 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-0166 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-0169 [YOCTO #3965] Signed-off-by: Radu Moisan <radu.moisan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>