path: root/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325-fix.patch

From 3e1e224fd031ae3927acda70f6e1fa55193e5b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 15:57:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tar,unzip: postpone creation of symlinks with "suspicious"
 targets

This mostly reverts commit bc9bbeb2b81001e8731cd2ae501c8fccc8d87cc7
"libarchive: do not extract unsafe symlinks unless $EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1"

Users report that it is somewhat too restrictive. See
https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=8411

In particular, this interferes with unpacking of busybox-based
filesystems with links like "sbin/applet" -> "../bin/busybox".

The change is made smaller by deleting ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET flag -
it is unused since 2010, and removing conditionals on it
allows commonalizing some error message codes.

function                                             old     new   delta
create_or_remember_symlink                             -      94     +94
create_symlinks_from_list                              -      64     +64
tar_main                                            1002    1006      +4
unzip_main                                          2732    2724      -8
data_extract_all                                     984     891     -93
unsafe_symlink_target                                147       -    -147
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 2/1 grow/shrink: 1/2 up/down: 162/-248)          Total: -86 bytes

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>

Upstream-Status: Backport from 1.28.2 [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?h=1_28_stable&id=37277a23fe48b13313f5d96084d890ed21d5fd8b]

Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
---
 archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c      | 50 +++++++++-------
 archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c | 63 +++++++++------------
 archival/tar.c                              |  2 +
 archival/unzip.c                            | 29 ++++++----
 include/bb_archive.h                        | 23 +++++---
 testsuite/tar.tests                         | 10 ++--
 6 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
index b828b656d..dad8d7d87 100644
--- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
+++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
@@ -108,9 +108,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
 			}
 		}
 		else if (existing_sb.st_mtime >= file_header->mtime) {
-			if (!(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
-			 && !S_ISDIR(file_header->mode)
-			) {
+			if (!S_ISDIR(file_header->mode)) {
 				bb_error_msg("%s not created: newer or "
 					"same age file exists", dst_name);
 			}
@@ -126,7 +124,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
 	/* Handle hard links separately */
 	if (hard_link) {
 		res = link(hard_link, dst_name);
-		if (res != 0 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)) {
+		if (res != 0) {
 			/* shared message */
 			bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
 					 "hard", dst_name, hard_link
@@ -166,10 +164,9 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
 	}
 	case S_IFDIR:
 		res = mkdir(dst_name, file_header->mode);
-		if ((res == -1)
+		if ((res != 0)
 		 && (errno != EISDIR) /* btw, Linux doesn't return this */
 		 && (errno != EEXIST)
-		 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
 		) {
 			bb_perror_msg("can't make dir %s", dst_name);
 		}
@@ -177,27 +174,38 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
 	case S_IFLNK:
 		/* Symlink */
 //TODO: what if file_header->link_target == NULL (say, corrupted tarball?)
-		if (!unsafe_symlink_target(file_header->link_target)) {
-			res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name);
-			if (res != 0
-				&& !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
-			) {
-						/* shared message */
-						bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-							"sym",
-							dst_name, file_header->link_target
-						);
-			}
-		}
+
+		/* To avoid a directory traversal attack via symlinks,
+		 * do not restore symlinks with ".." components
+		 * or symlinks starting with "/", unless a magic
+		 * envvar is set.
+		 *
+		 * For example, consider a .tar created via:
+		 *  $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt
+		 *  $ ln -s /tmp symlink
+		 *  $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink
+		 *  $ rm symlink
+		 *  $ mkdir symlink
+		 *  $ tar --append -f bug.tar symlink/evil.py
+		 *
+		 * This will result in an archive that contains:
+		 *  $ tar --list -f bug.tar
+		 *  anything.txt
+		 *  symlink [-> /tmp]
+		 *  symlink/evil.py
+		 *
+		 * Untarring bug.tar would otherwise place evil.py in '/tmp'.
+		 */
+		create_or_remember_symlink(&archive_handle->symlink_placeholders,
+				file_header->link_target,
+				dst_name);
 		break;
 	case S_IFSOCK:
 	case S_IFBLK:
 	case S_IFCHR:
 	case S_IFIFO:
 		res = mknod(dst_name, file_header->mode, file_header->device);
-		if ((res == -1)
-		 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
-		) {
+		if (res != 0) {
 			bb_perror_msg("can't create node %s", dst_name);
 		}
 		break;
diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
index ee46e28f8..8dcafeaa1 100644
--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
+++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
@@ -5,44 +5,37 @@
 #include "libbb.h"
 #include "bb_archive.h"
 
-int FAST_FUNC unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target)
+void FAST_FUNC create_or_remember_symlink(llist_t **symlink_placeholders,
+		const char *target,
+		const char *linkname)
 {
-	const char *dot;
-
-	if (target[0] == '/') {
-		const char *var;
-unsafe:
-		var = getenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS");
-		if (var) {
-			if (LONE_CHAR(var, '1'))
-				return 0; /* pretend it's safe */
-			return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
-		}
-		bb_error_msg("skipping unsafe symlink to '%s' in archive,"
-			" set %s=1 to extract",
-			target,
-			"EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS"
+	if (target[0] == '/' || strstr(target, "..")) {
+		llist_add_to(symlink_placeholders,
+			xasprintf("%s%c%s", linkname, '\0', target)
+		);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (symlink(target, linkname) != 0) {
+		/* shared message */
+		bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
+			"sym", linkname, target
 		);
-		/* Prevent further messages */
-		setenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS", "0", 0);
-		return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
 	}
+}
 
-	dot = target;
-	for (;;) {
-		dot = strchr(dot, '.');
-			if (!dot)
-				return 0; /* safe target */
+void FAST_FUNC create_symlinks_from_list(llist_t *list)
+{
+	while (list) {
+		char *target;
 
-			/* Is it a path component starting with ".."? */
-			if ((dot[1] == '.')
-				&& (dot == target || dot[-1] == '/')
-					/* Is it exactly ".."? */
-				&& (dot[2] == '/' || dot[2] == '\0')
-			) {
-				goto unsafe;
-			}
-			/* NB: it can even be trailing ".", should only add 1 */
-			dot += 1;
+		target = list->data + strlen(list->data) + 1;
+		if (symlink(target, list->data)) {
+			/* shared message */
+			bb_error_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
+				"sym",
+				list->data, target
+			);
+		}
+		list = list->link;
 	}
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
diff --git a/archival/tar.c b/archival/tar.c
index 7598b71e3..bde86330c 100644
--- a/archival/tar.c
+++ b/archival/tar.c
@@ -1252,6 +1252,8 @@ int tar_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	while (get_header_tar(tar_handle) == EXIT_SUCCESS)
 		bb_got_signal = EXIT_SUCCESS; /* saw at least one header, good */
 
+	create_symlinks_from_list(tar_handle->symlink_placeholders);
+
 	/* Check that every file that should have been extracted was */
 	while (tar_handle->accept) {
 		if (!find_list_entry(tar_handle->reject, tar_handle->accept->data)
diff --git a/archival/unzip.c b/archival/unzip.c
index 270e261b7..2f53ab7a4 100644
--- a/archival/unzip.c
+++ b/archival/unzip.c
@@ -335,7 +335,10 @@ static void unzip_create_leading_dirs(const char *fn)
 	free(name);
 }
 
-static void unzip_extract_symlink(zip_header_t *zip, const char *dst_fn)
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
+static void unzip_extract_symlink(llist_t **symlink_placeholders,
+		zip_header_t *zip,
+		const char *dst_fn)
 {
 	char *target;
 
@@ -361,17 +364,12 @@ static void unzip_extract_symlink(zip_header_t *zip, const char *dst_fn)
 		target[xstate.mem_output_size] = '\0';
 #endif
 	}
-	if (!unsafe_symlink_target(target)) {
-//TODO: libbb candidate
-		if (symlink(target, dst_fn)) {
-			/* shared message */
-			bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-				"sym", dst_fn, target
-			);
-		}
-	}
+	create_or_remember_symlink(symlink_placeholders,
+			target,
+			dst_fn);
 	free(target);
 }
+#endif
 
 static void unzip_extract(zip_header_t *zip, int dst_fd)
 {
@@ -464,6 +462,9 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
 	llist_t *zaccept = NULL;
 	llist_t *zreject = NULL;
 	char *base_dir = NULL;
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
+	llist_t *symlink_placeholders = NULL;
+#endif
 	int i, opt;
 	char key_buf[80]; /* must match size used by my_fgets80 */
 	struct stat stat_buf;
@@ -894,8 +895,8 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
 			if (S_ISLNK(file_mode)) {
-				if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) /* no -p */
-					unzip_extract_symlink(&zip, dst_fn);
+				if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) /* not -p? */
+					unzip_extract_symlink(&symlink_placeholders, &zip, dst_fn);
 			} else
 #endif
 			{
@@ -931,6 +932,10 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
 		total_entries++;
 	}
 
+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
+	create_symlinks_from_list(symlink_placeholders);
+#endif
+
 	if (listing && quiet <= 1) {
 		if (!verbose) {
 			//	"  Length      Date    Time    Name\n"
diff --git a/include/bb_archive.h b/include/bb_archive.h
index 1e4da3c33..436eb0fe3 100644
--- a/include/bb_archive.h
+++ b/include/bb_archive.h
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ typedef struct archive_handle_t {
 	/* Currently processed file's header */
 	file_header_t *file_header;
 
+	/* List of symlink placeholders */
+	llist_t *symlink_placeholders;
+
 	/* Process the header component, e.g. tar -t */
 	void FAST_FUNC (*action_header)(const file_header_t *);
 
@@ -119,15 +122,14 @@ typedef struct archive_handle_t {
 #define ARCHIVE_RESTORE_DATE        (1 << 0)
 #define ARCHIVE_CREATE_LEADING_DIRS (1 << 1)
 #define ARCHIVE_UNLINK_OLD          (1 << 2)
-#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET       (1 << 3)
-#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NEWER       (1 << 4)
-#define ARCHIVE_DONT_RESTORE_OWNER  (1 << 5)
-#define ARCHIVE_DONT_RESTORE_PERM   (1 << 6)
-#define ARCHIVE_NUMERIC_OWNER       (1 << 7)
-#define ARCHIVE_O_TRUNC             (1 << 8)
-#define ARCHIVE_REMEMBER_NAMES      (1 << 9)
+#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NEWER       (1 << 3)
+#define ARCHIVE_DONT_RESTORE_OWNER  (1 << 4)
+#define ARCHIVE_DONT_RESTORE_PERM   (1 << 5)
+#define ARCHIVE_NUMERIC_OWNER       (1 << 6)
+#define ARCHIVE_O_TRUNC             (1 << 7)
+#define ARCHIVE_REMEMBER_NAMES      (1 << 8)
 #if ENABLE_RPM
-#define ARCHIVE_REPLACE_VIA_RENAME  (1 << 10)
+#define ARCHIVE_REPLACE_VIA_RENAME  (1 << 9)
 #endif
 
 
@@ -196,7 +198,10 @@ void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
 void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
 
 const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
-int unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target) FAST_FUNC;
+void create_or_remember_symlink(llist_t **symlink_placeholders,
+		const char *target,
+		const char *linkname) FAST_FUNC;
+void create_symlinks_from_list(llist_t *list) FAST_FUNC;
 
 void data_align(archive_handle_t *archive_handle, unsigned boundary) FAST_FUNC;
 const llist_t *find_list_entry(const llist_t *list, const char *filename) FAST_FUNC;
diff --git a/testsuite/tar.tests b/testsuite/tar.tests
index 127eeaaee..21cef49fe 100755
--- a/testsuite/tar.tests
+++ b/testsuite/tar.tests
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
 testing "tar does not extract into symlinks" "\
 >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
 " "\
-tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
+tar: can't create symlink 'passwd' to '/tmp/passwd'
 0
 " \
 "" "\
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
 testing "tar -k does not extract into symlinks" "\
 >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input -k 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
 " "\
-tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
+tar: can't create symlink 'passwd' to '/tmp/passwd'
 0
 " \
 "" "\
@@ -324,11 +324,11 @@ rm -rf etc usr
 ' "\
 etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0
 etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
-tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
 etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0
 usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
 0
 etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
+etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem -> /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
 etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
 " \
 "" ""
@@ -346,9 +346,9 @@ ls symlink/bb_test_evilfile
 ' "\
 anything.txt
 symlink
-tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
 symlink/bb_test_evilfile
-0
+tar: can't create symlink 'symlink' to '/tmp'
+1
 ls: /tmp/bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
 ls: bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
 symlink/bb_test_evilfile
-- 
2.17.1