curl : moved unused files to obsolete dir

Signed-off-by: Frans Meulenbroeks <fransmeulenbroeks@gmail.com>

3 files changed, 0 insertions, 185 deletions

diff --git a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e7c24c0b6e..0000000000
--- a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
----
- lib/ssluse.c |   40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
---- lib/ssluse.c.orig
-+++ lib/ssluse.c
-@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
-       if(check->type == target) {
-         /* get data and length */
-         const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
--        int altlen;
-+        size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
- 
-         switch(target) {
-         case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
-@@ -1075,14 +1075,16 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
-              "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
-              it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
-           */
--          if(cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
-+          if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
-+             /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
-+                string and we cannot match it. */
-+             cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
-             matched = TRUE;
-           break;
- 
-         case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
-           /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
-              our server IP address is */
--          altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-           if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
-             matched = TRUE;
-           break;
-@@ -1122,18 +1124,27 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
-          string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
-          conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
-          brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
--      if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
--        j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
--        if(j >= 0) {
--          peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
--          if(peer_CN) {
--            memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
--            peer_CN[j] = '\0';
-+      if(tmp) {
-+        if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
-+          j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
-+          if(j >= 0) {
-+            peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
-+            if(peer_CN) {
-+              memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
-+              peer_CN[j] = '\0';
-+            }
-           }
-         }
-+        else /* not a UTF8 name */
-+          j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
-+
-+        if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
-+          /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
-+             cannot match and we return failure! */
-+          failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
-+          res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
-+        }
-       }
--      else /* not a UTF8 name */
--        j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
-     }
- 
-     if(peer_CN == nulstr)
-@@ -1151,7 +1162,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
-     }
- #endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
- 
--    if(!peer_CN) {
-+    if(res)
-+      /* error already detected, pass through */
-+      ;
-+    else if(!peer_CN) {
-       failf(data,
-             "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
-       return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
diff --git a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f64232c502..0000000000
--- a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
---- lib/ssluse.c-7.19.5	2009-08-03 16:01:58.000000000 +0200
-+++ lib/ssluse.c	2009-08-03 16:07:17.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@
-       if(check->type == target) {
-         /* get data and length */
-         const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
--        size_t altlen;
-+        size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-+
- 
-         switch(target) {
-         case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
-@@ -1106,14 +1107,16 @@
-              "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
-              it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
-           */
--          if(cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
-+          if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
-+             /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
-+                string and we cannot match it. */
-+             cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
-             matched = TRUE;
-           break;
- 
-         case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
-           /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
-              our server IP address is */
--          altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-           if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
-             matched = TRUE;
-           break;
-@@ -1153,18 +1156,27 @@
-          string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
-          conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
-          brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
--      if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
--        j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
--        if(j >= 0) {
--          peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
--          if(peer_CN) {
--            memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
--            peer_CN[j] = '\0';
-+      if(tmp) {
-+        if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
-+          j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
-+          if(j >= 0) {
-+            peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
-+            if(peer_CN) {
-+              memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
-+              peer_CN[j] = '\0';
-+            }
-           }
-         }
-+        else /* not a UTF8 name */
-+          j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
-+
-+        if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
-+          /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
-+             cannot match and we return failure! */
-+          failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
-+          res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
-+        }
-       }
--      else /* not a UTF8 name */
--        j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
-     }
- 
-     if(peer_CN == nulstr)
-@@ -1182,7 +1194,10 @@
-     }
- #endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
- 
--    if(!peer_CN) {
-+    if(res)
-+      /* error already detected, pass through */
-+      ;
-+    else if(!peer_CN) {
-       failf(data,
-             "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
-       return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
diff --git a/recipes/curl/files/curl-add_all_algorithms.patch b/recipes/curl/files/curl-add_all_algorithms.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a55af12575..0000000000
--- a/recipes/curl/files/curl-add_all_algorithms.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
---- curl-7.19.5/lib/ssluse.c	2009-01-26 15:36:22.000000000 +0100
-+++ curl-7.19.5/lib/ssluse.c	2009-07-23 15:44:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
- #ifdef USE_SSLEAY
- 
- #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
- #else
-@@ -627,6 +628,11 @@
-   /* Lets get nice error messages */
-   SSL_load_error_strings();
- 
-+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-+  /* Load all algorithms (including SHA2) */
-+  OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-+
-   /* Setup all the global SSL stuff */
-   if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
-     return 0;