curl: apply patch for CVE-2009-2417

2 files changed, 163 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e7c24c0b6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.18.1-CVE-2009-2417.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+---
+ lib/ssluse.c |   40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- lib/ssluse.c.orig
++++ lib/ssluse.c
+@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+       if(check->type == target) {
+         /* get data and length */
+         const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+-        int altlen;
++        size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+ 
+         switch(target) {
+         case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+@@ -1075,14 +1075,16 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+              "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+              it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+           */
+-          if(cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
++          if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
++             /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
++                string and we cannot match it. */
++             cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+             matched = TRUE;
+           break;
+ 
+         case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+           /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+              our server IP address is */
+-          altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+           if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
+             matched = TRUE;
+           break;
+@@ -1122,18 +1124,27 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+          string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+          conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+          brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+-      if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+-        j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+-        if(j >= 0) {
+-          peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+-          if(peer_CN) {
+-            memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+-            peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++      if(tmp) {
++        if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
++          j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
++          if(j >= 0) {
++            peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
++            if(peer_CN) {
++              memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
++              peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++            }
+           }
+         }
++        else /* not a UTF8 name */
++          j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
++
++        if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
++          /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
++             cannot match and we return failure! */
++          failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
++          res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
++        }
+       }
+-      else /* not a UTF8 name */
+-        j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+     }
+ 
+     if(peer_CN == nulstr)
+@@ -1151,7 +1162,10 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connec
+     }
+ #endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
+ 
+-    if(!peer_CN) {
++    if(res)
++      /* error already detected, pass through */
++      ;
++    else if(!peer_CN) {
+       failf(data,
+             "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+       return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
diff --git a/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f64232c502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes/curl/files/curl-7.19.5-CVE-2009-2417.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+--- lib/ssluse.c-7.19.5	2009-08-03 16:01:58.000000000 +0200
++++ lib/ssluse.c	2009-08-03 16:07:17.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@
+       if(check->type == target) {
+         /* get data and length */
+         const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+-        size_t altlen;
++        size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
++
+ 
+         switch(target) {
+         case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+@@ -1106,14 +1107,16 @@
+              "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+              it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+           */
+-          if(cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
++          if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
++             /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
++                string and we cannot match it. */
++             cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+             matched = TRUE;
+           break;
+ 
+         case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+           /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+              our server IP address is */
+-          altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+           if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
+             matched = TRUE;
+           break;
+@@ -1153,18 +1156,27 @@
+          string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+          conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+          brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+-      if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+-        j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+-        if(j >= 0) {
+-          peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+-          if(peer_CN) {
+-            memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+-            peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++      if(tmp) {
++        if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
++          j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
++          if(j >= 0) {
++            peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
++            if(peer_CN) {
++              memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
++              peer_CN[j] = '\0';
++            }
+           }
+         }
++        else /* not a UTF8 name */
++          j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
++
++        if(peer_CN && ((int)strlen((char *)peer_CN) != j)) {
++          /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
++             cannot match and we return failure! */
++          failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
++          res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
++        }
+       }
+-      else /* not a UTF8 name */
+-        j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+     }
+ 
+     if(peer_CN == nulstr)
+@@ -1182,7 +1194,10 @@
+     }
+ #endif /* CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS */
+ 
+-    if(!peer_CN) {
++    if(res)
++      /* error already detected, pass through */
++      ;
++    else if(!peer_CN) {
+       failf(data,
+             "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+       return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;