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authorKang Kai <kai.kang@windriver.com>2014-10-29 09:40:08 +0800
committerPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-10-31 11:35:25 +0000
commita4fd0b34103f3fc6365eb154ea5277485ed01a5c (patch)
tree8257c1c6f68300a33a9023f65d820a39ddfeeaed /meta-webserver/recipes-httpd
parent6aee5729848d48f57fdab9c6aafc61f86ad86135 (diff)
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apache: add fix for CVE-2014-0117 Security Advisory
The patch comes from upstream: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1610674 SECURITY (CVE-2014-0117): Fix a crash in mod_proxy. In a reverse proxy configuration, a remote attacker could send a carefully crafted request which could crash a server process, resulting in denial of service. Thanks to Marek Kroemeke working with HP's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue. Submitted by: Edward Lu, breser, covener Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-webserver/recipes-httpd')
-rw-r--r--meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch289
-rw-r--r--meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.10.bb4
2 files changed, 292 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8585f0bb307
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+apache: CVE-2014-0117
+
+The patch comes from upstream:
+http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1610674
+
+SECURITY (CVE-2014-0117): Fix a crash in mod_proxy. In a
+reverse proxy configuration, a remote attacker could send a carefully crafted
+request which could crash a server process, resulting in denial of service.
+
+Thanks to Marek Kroemeke working with HP's Zero Day Initiative for
+reporting this issue.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Submitted by: Edward Lu, breser, covener
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 8 +++-
+ include/httpd.h | 17 ++++++++
+ modules/proxy/proxy_util.c | 67 ++++++++++++++----------------
+ server/util.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+index cffad2e..f11c16f 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+@@ -1362,6 +1362,7 @@ apr_status_t ap_proxy_http_process_response(apr_pool_t * p, request_rec *r,
+ */
+ if (apr_date_checkmask(buffer, "HTTP/#.# ###*")) {
+ int major, minor;
++ int toclose;
+
+ major = buffer[5] - '0';
+ minor = buffer[7] - '0';
+@@ -1470,7 +1471,12 @@ apr_status_t ap_proxy_http_process_response(apr_pool_t * p, request_rec *r,
+ te = apr_table_get(r->headers_out, "Transfer-Encoding");
+
+ /* strip connection listed hop-by-hop headers from response */
+- backend->close = ap_proxy_clear_connection_fn(r, r->headers_out);
++ toclose = ap_proxy_clear_connection_fn(r, r->headers_out);
++ backend->close = (toclose != 0);
++ if (toclose < 0) {
++ return ap_proxyerror(r, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
++ "Malformed connection header");
++ }
+
+ if ((buf = apr_table_get(r->headers_out, "Content-Type"))) {
+ ap_set_content_type(r, apr_pstrdup(p, buf));
+diff --git a/include/httpd.h b/include/httpd.h
+index 36cd58d..9a2cf5c 100644
+--- a/include/httpd.h
++++ b/include/httpd.h
+@@ -1528,6 +1528,23 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line, const char *t
+ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_strong(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line, const char *tok);
+
+ /**
++ * Retrieve an array of tokens in the format "1#token" defined in RFC2616. Only
++ * accepts ',' as a delimiter, does not accept quoted strings, and errors on
++ * any separator.
++ * @param p The pool to allocate from
++ * @param tok The line to read tokens from
++ * @param tokens Pointer to an array of tokens. If not NULL, must be an array
++ * of char*, otherwise it will be allocated on @a p when a token is found
++ * @param skip_invalid If true, when an invalid separator is encountered, it
++ * will be ignored.
++ * @return NULL on success, an error string otherwise.
++ * @remark *tokens may be NULL on output if NULL in input and no token is found
++ */
++AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p, const char *tok,
++ apr_array_header_t **tokens,
++ int skip_invalid);
++
++/**
+ * Retrieve a token, spacing over it and adjusting the pointer to
+ * the first non-white byte afterwards. Note that these tokens
+ * are delimited by semis and commas and can also be delimited
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c b/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
+index 67dc939..58daa21 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
+@@ -2847,68 +2847,59 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(proxy_balancer_shared *) ap_proxy_find_balancershm(ap_slotmem_prov
+ typedef struct header_connection {
+ apr_pool_t *pool;
+ apr_array_header_t *array;
+- const char *first;
+- unsigned int closed:1;
++ const char *error;
++ int is_req;
+ } header_connection;
+
+ static int find_conn_headers(void *data, const char *key, const char *val)
+ {
+ header_connection *x = data;
+- const char *name;
+-
+- do {
+- while (*val == ',' || *val == ';') {
+- val++;
+- }
+- name = ap_get_token(x->pool, &val, 0);
+- if (!strcasecmp(name, "close")) {
+- x->closed = 1;
+- }
+- if (!x->first) {
+- x->first = name;
+- }
+- else {
+- const char **elt;
+- if (!x->array) {
+- x->array = apr_array_make(x->pool, 4, sizeof(char *));
+- }
+- elt = apr_array_push(x->array);
+- *elt = name;
+- }
+- } while (*val);
+
+- return 1;
++ x->error = ap_parse_token_list_strict(x->pool, val, &x->array, !x->is_req);
++ return !x->error;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Remove all headers referred to by the Connection header.
++ * Returns -1 on error. Otherwise, returns 1 if 'Close' was seen in
++ * the Connection header tokens, and 0 if not.
+ */
+ static int ap_proxy_clear_connection(request_rec *r, apr_table_t *headers)
+ {
+- const char **name;
++ int closed = 0;
+ header_connection x;
+
+ x.pool = r->pool;
+ x.array = NULL;
+- x.first = NULL;
+- x.closed = 0;
++ x.error = NULL;
++ x.is_req = (headers == r->headers_in);
+
+ apr_table_unset(headers, "Proxy-Connection");
+
+ apr_table_do(find_conn_headers, &x, headers, "Connection", NULL);
+- if (x.first) {
+- /* fast path - no memory allocated for one header */
+- apr_table_unset(headers, "Connection");
+- apr_table_unset(headers, x.first);
++ apr_table_unset(headers, "Connection");
++
++ if (x.error) {
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, r, APLOGNO()
++ "Error parsing Connection header: %s", x.error);
++ return -1;
+ }
++
+ if (x.array) {
+- /* two or more headers */
+- while ((name = apr_array_pop(x.array))) {
+- apr_table_unset(headers, *name);
++ int i;
++ for (i = 0; i < x.array->nelts; i++) {
++ const char *name = APR_ARRAY_IDX(x.array, i, const char *);
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO()
++ "Removing header '%s' listed in Connection header",
++ name);
++ if (!strcasecmp(name, "close")) {
++ closed = 1;
++ }
++ apr_table_unset(headers, name);
+ }
+ }
+
+- return x.closed;
++ return closed;
+ }
+
+ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_create_hdrbrgd(apr_pool_t *p,
+@@ -3095,7 +3086,9 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_create_hdrbrgd(apr_pool_t *p,
+ * apr is compiled with APR_POOL_DEBUG.
+ */
+ headers_in_copy = apr_table_copy(r->pool, r->headers_in);
+- ap_proxy_clear_connection(r, headers_in_copy);
++ if (ap_proxy_clear_connection(r, headers_in_copy) < 0) {
++ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++ }
+ /* send request headers */
+ headers_in_array = apr_table_elts(headers_in_copy);
+ headers_in = (const apr_table_entry_t *) headers_in_array->elts;
+diff --git a/server/util.c b/server/util.c
+index e0ba5c2..541c9f0 100644
+--- a/server/util.c
++++ b/server/util.c
+@@ -1449,6 +1449,95 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line,
+ return find_list_item(p, line, tok, AP_ETAG_WEAK);
+ }
+
++/* Grab a list of tokens of the format 1#token (from RFC7230) */
++AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
++ const char *str_in,
++ apr_array_header_t **tokens,
++ int skip_invalid)
++{
++ int in_leading_space = 1;
++ int in_trailing_space = 0;
++ int string_end = 0;
++ const char *tok_begin;
++ const char *cur;
++
++ if (!str_in) {
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ tok_begin = cur = str_in;
++
++ while (!string_end) {
++ const unsigned char c = (unsigned char)*cur;
++
++ if (!TEST_CHAR(c, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP) && c != '\0') {
++ /* Non-separator character; we are finished with leading
++ * whitespace. We must never have encountered any trailing
++ * whitespace before the delimiter (comma) */
++ in_leading_space = 0;
++ if (in_trailing_space) {
++ return "Encountered illegal whitespace in token";
++ }
++ }
++ else if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') {
++ /* "Linear whitespace" only includes ASCII CRLF, space, and tab;
++ * we can't get a CRLF since headers are split on them already,
++ * so only look for a space or a tab */
++ if (in_leading_space) {
++ /* We're still in leading whitespace */
++ ++tok_begin;
++ }
++ else {
++ /* We must be in trailing whitespace */
++ ++in_trailing_space;
++ }
++ }
++ else if (c == ',' || c == '\0') {
++ if (!in_leading_space) {
++ /* If we're out of the leading space, we know we've read some
++ * characters of a token */
++ if (*tokens == NULL) {
++ *tokens = apr_array_make(p, 4, sizeof(char *));
++ }
++ APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*tokens, char *) =
++ apr_pstrmemdup((*tokens)->pool, tok_begin,
++ (cur - tok_begin) - in_trailing_space);
++ }
++ /* We're allowed to have null elements, just don't add them to the
++ * array */
++
++ tok_begin = cur + 1;
++ in_leading_space = 1;
++ in_trailing_space = 0;
++ string_end = (c == '\0');
++ }
++ else {
++ /* Encountered illegal separator char */
++ if (skip_invalid) {
++ /* Skip to the next separator */
++ const char *temp;
++ temp = ap_strchr_c(cur, ',');
++ if(!temp) {
++ temp = ap_strchr_c(cur, '\0');
++ }
++
++ /* Act like we haven't seen a token so we reset */
++ cur = temp - 1;
++ in_leading_space = 1;
++ in_trailing_space = 0;
++ }
++ else {
++ return apr_psprintf(p, "Encountered illegal separator "
++ "'\\x%.2x'", (unsigned int)c);
++ }
++ }
++
++ ++cur;
++ }
++
++ return NULL;
++}
++
+ /* Retrieve a token, spacing over it and returning a pointer to
+ * the first non-white byte afterwards. Note that these tokens
+ * are delimited by semis and commas; and can also be delimited
+--
diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.10.bb b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.10.bb
index 573cd6fb009..d79d40bd2c9 100644
--- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.10.bb
+++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.10.bb
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch \
file://init \
file://apache2-volatile.conf \
- file://apache2.service"
+ file://apache2.service \
+ file://apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch \
+ "
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=dbff5a2b542fa58854455bf1a0b94b83"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "44543dff14a4ebc1e9e2d86780507156"