diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2023-41913.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2023-41913.patch | 46 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2023-41913.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2023-41913.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c0de1f1588 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2023-41913.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 027421cbd2e6e628f5f959c74d722afadc477485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 12:12:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] charon-tkm: Validate DH public key to fix potential buffer + overflow + +Seems this was forgotten in the referenced commit and actually could lead +to a buffer overflow. Since charon-tkm is untrusted this isn't that +much of an issue but could at least be easily exploited for a DoS attack +as DH public values are set when handling IKE_SA_INIT requests. + +Fixes: 0356089d0f94 ("diffie-hellman: Verify public DH values in backends") +Fixes: CVE-2023-41913 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2023-41913/strongswan-5.3.0-5.9.6_charon_tkm_dh_len.patch] +CVE: CVE-2023-41913 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com> +--- + src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c b/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c +index 2b2d103d03e9..6999ad360d7e 100644 +--- a/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c ++++ b/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c +@@ -70,11 +70,16 @@ METHOD(key_exchange_t, get_shared_secret, bool, + return TRUE; + } + +- + METHOD(diffie_hellman_t, set_other_public_value, bool, + private_tkm_diffie_hellman_t *this, chunk_t value) + { + dh_pubvalue_type othervalue; ++ ++ if (!key_exchange_verify_pubkey(this->group, value) || ++ value.len > sizeof(othervalue.data)) ++ { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + othervalue.size = value.len; + memcpy(&othervalue.data, value.ptr, value.len); + +-- +2.34.1 + |