aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorwangmy <wangmy@fujitsu.com>2021-05-18 16:03:32 +0800
committerArmin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>2021-05-22 16:13:38 -0700
commit29953069d9d9c2868d831492ccec7b171403ac04 (patch)
treef5ae196e8e72c5b20d43cfa9f6f3c67bc6f89fa6
parentbe0cc5e79b98a9c47f5bb8915f6c411484d0d6f2 (diff)
downloadmeta-openembedded-29953069d9d9c2868d831492ccec7b171403ac04.tar.gz
meta-openembedded-29953069d9d9c2868d831492ccec7b171403ac04.tar.bz2
meta-openembedded-29953069d9d9c2868d831492ccec7b171403ac04.zip
exiv2: Fix CVE-2021-29464
References https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-29464 The heap overflow is triggered when Exiv2 is used to write metadata into a crafted image file. An attacker could potentially exploit the vulnerability to gain code execution, if they can trick the victim into running Exiv2 on a crafted image file. Upstream-Status: Accepted [https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/f9308839198aca5e68a65194f151a1de92398f54] CVE: CVE-2021-29464 Signed-off-by: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit 8c9470bdfaa1d33347ffaf25b3e18d2163667e18) Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2/CVE-2021-29464.patch72
-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2_0.27.3.bb1
2 files changed, 73 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2/CVE-2021-29464.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2/CVE-2021-29464.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0c482450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2/CVE-2021-29464.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 61734d8842cb9cc59437463e3bac54d6231d9487 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:52:54 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] modify
+
+Signed-off-by: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/jp2image.cpp | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jp2image.cpp b/src/jp2image.cpp
+index 52723a4..0ac4f50 100644
+--- a/src/jp2image.cpp
++++ b/src/jp2image.cpp
+@@ -643,11 +643,11 @@ static void boxes_check(size_t b,size_t m)
+ void Jp2Image::encodeJp2Header(const DataBuf& boxBuf,DataBuf& outBuf)
+ {
+ DataBuf output(boxBuf.size_ + iccProfile_.size_ + 100); // allocate sufficient space
+- int outlen = sizeof(Jp2BoxHeader) ; // now many bytes have we written to output?
+- int inlen = sizeof(Jp2BoxHeader) ; // how many bytes have we read from boxBuf?
++ long outlen = sizeof(Jp2BoxHeader) ; // now many bytes have we written to output?
++ long inlen = sizeof(Jp2BoxHeader) ; // how many bytes have we read from boxBuf?
+ Jp2BoxHeader* pBox = (Jp2BoxHeader*) boxBuf.pData_;
+- int32_t length = getLong((byte*)&pBox->length, bigEndian);
+- int32_t count = sizeof (Jp2BoxHeader);
++ uint32_t length = getLong((byte*)&pBox->length, bigEndian);
++ uint32_t count = sizeof (Jp2BoxHeader);
+ char* p = (char*) boxBuf.pData_;
+ bool bWroteColor = false ;
+
+@@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ static void boxes_check(size_t b,size_t m)
+ #ifdef EXIV2_DEBUG_MESSAGES
+ std::cout << "Jp2Image::encodeJp2Header subbox: "<< toAscii(subBox.type) << " length = " << subBox.length << std::endl;
+ #endif
++ enforce(subBox.length <= length - count, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
+ count += subBox.length;
+ newBox.type = subBox.type;
+ } else {
+@@ -672,12 +673,13 @@ static void boxes_check(size_t b,size_t m)
+ count = length;
+ }
+
+- int32_t newlen = subBox.length;
++ uint32_t newlen = subBox.length;
+ if ( newBox.type == kJp2BoxTypeColorHeader ) {
+ bWroteColor = true ;
+ if ( ! iccProfileDefined() ) {
+ const char* pad = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x05\x1cuuid";
+ uint32_t psize = 15;
++ enforce(newlen <= output.size_ - outlen, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
+ ul2Data((byte*)&newBox.length,psize ,bigEndian);
+ ul2Data((byte*)&newBox.type ,newBox.type,bigEndian);
+ ::memcpy(output.pData_+outlen ,&newBox ,sizeof(newBox));
+@@ -686,6 +688,7 @@ static void boxes_check(size_t b,size_t m)
+ } else {
+ const char* pad = "\0x02\x00\x00";
+ uint32_t psize = 3;
++ enforce(newlen <= output.size_ - outlen, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
+ ul2Data((byte*)&newBox.length,psize+iccProfile_.size_,bigEndian);
+ ul2Data((byte*)&newBox.type,newBox.type,bigEndian);
+ ::memcpy(output.pData_+outlen ,&newBox ,sizeof(newBox) );
+@@ -694,6 +697,7 @@ static void boxes_check(size_t b,size_t m)
+ newlen = psize + iccProfile_.size_;
+ }
+ } else {
++ enforce(newlen <= output.size_ - outlen, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
+ ::memcpy(output.pData_+outlen,boxBuf.pData_+inlen,subBox.length);
+ }
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2_0.27.3.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2_0.27.3.bb
index 8c4c81799..024f4c794 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2_0.27.3.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/exiv2/exiv2_0.27.3.bb
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-Use-compiler-fcf-protection-only-if-compiler-arch-su.pat
file://CVE-2021-29457.patch \
file://CVE-2021-29458.patch \
file://CVE-2021-29463.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-29464.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3482.patch"
S = "${WORKDIR}/${BPN}-${PV}-Source"