diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7118ba1fb --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 423a5d56274a1d343e0d2107dfc4fbf0df2dcca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 17:52:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Reject RSASSA-PSS params with negative salt length + +The `salt_len` member in the struct is of type `ssize_t` because we use +negative values for special automatic salt lengths when generating +signatures. + +Not checking this could lead to an integer overflow. The value is assigned +to the `len` field of a chunk (`size_t`), which is further used in +calculations to check the padding structure and (if that is passed by a +matching crafted signature value) eventually a memcpy() that will result +in a segmentation fault. + +Fixes: a22316520b91 ("signature-params: Add functions to parse/build ASN.1 RSASSA-PSS params") +Fixes: 7d6b81648b2d ("gmp: Add support for RSASSA-PSS signature verification") +Fixes: CVE-2021-41990 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41990] +CVE: CVE-2021-41990 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c | 6 +++++- + src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +index d89bd2c96bb5..837de8443d43 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ bool rsa_pss_params_parse(chunk_t asn1, int level0, rsa_pss_params_t *params) + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_SALT_LEN: + if (object.len) + { +- params->salt_len = (size_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ params->salt_len = (ssize_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ if (params->salt_len < 0) ++ { ++ goto end; ++ } + } + break; + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_TRAILER: +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +index f9bd1d314dec..3a775090883e 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, + int i; + bool success = FALSE; + +- if (!params) ++ if (!params || params->salt_len < 0) + { + return FALSE; + } +-- +2.25.1 + |