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-rw-r--r--meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis/fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch61
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis/fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis/fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6311a5db1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis/fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From e9a1438ac4c52aa68dfa2a8324b6419356842116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 09:12:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-32625) (#9011)
+
+An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the
+STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
+execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1ddecf1958924b178b76a31d989ef1e05af81964)
+
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-32625
+Upstream-Status: Backport [e9a1438ac4c52aa68dfa2a8324b6419356842116]
+
+Signed-off-by: Tony Tascioglu <tony.tascioglu@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/t_string.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c
+index 490d5983a..587d3aeb8 100644
+--- a/src/t_string.c
++++ b/src/t_string.c
+@@ -797,6 +797,12 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
++ /* Detect string truncation or later overflows. */
++ if (sdslen(a) >= UINT32_MAX-1 || sdslen(b) >= UINT32_MAX-1) {
++ addReplyError(c, "String too long for LCS");
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
+ /* Compute the LCS using the vanilla dynamic programming technique of
+ * building a table of LCS(x,y) substrings. */
+ uint32_t alen = sdslen(a);
+@@ -805,9 +811,19 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
+ /* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the
+ * LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so
+ * we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */
+- uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
+ #define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))]
+
++ /* Try to allocate the LCS table, and abort on overflow or insufficient memory. */
++ unsigned long long lcssize = (unsigned long long)(alen+1)*(blen+1); /* Can't overflow due to the size limits above. */
++ unsigned long long lcsalloc = lcssize * sizeof(uint32_t);
++ uint32_t *lcs = NULL;
++ if (lcsalloc < SIZE_MAX && lcsalloc / lcssize == sizeof(uint32_t))
++ lcs = ztrymalloc(lcsalloc);
++ if (!lcs) {
++ addReplyError(c, "Insufficient memory");
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
+ /* Start building the LCS table. */
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i <= alen; i++) {
+ for (uint32_t j = 0; j <= blen; j++) {
+--
+2.32.0
+