From f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oran Agra Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 08:32:31 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-29477) An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code execution. CVE: CVE-2021-29477 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9] Signed-off-by: Tony Tascioglu --- src/t_string.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c index 9228c5ed0..db6f7042e 100644 --- a/src/t_string.c +++ b/src/t_string.c @@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) { /* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the * LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so * we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */ - uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t)); + uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t)); #define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))] /* Start building the LCS table. */ -- 2.32.0