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From f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 08:32:31 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-29477)

An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.

CVE: CVE-2021-29477
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9]

Signed-off-by: Tony Tascioglu <tony.tascioglu@windriver.com>

---
 src/t_string.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c
index 9228c5ed0..db6f7042e 100644
--- a/src/t_string.c
+++ b/src/t_string.c
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
     /* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the
      * LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so
      * we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */
-    uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
+    uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
     #define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))]
 
     /* Start building the LCS table. */
-- 
2.32.0