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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch64
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9927584d11b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-15863.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 5519724a13664b43e225ca05351c60b4468e4555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 11:19:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/net/xgmac: Fix buffer overflow in xgmac_enet_send()
+
+A buffer overflow issue was reported by Mr. Ziming Zhang, CC'd here. It
+occurs while sending an Ethernet frame due to missing break statements
+and improper checking of the buffer size.
+
+Reported-by: Ziming Zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2020-15863
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=5519724a13664b43e225ca05351c60b4468e4555]
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/xgmac.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/xgmac.c b/hw/net/xgmac.c
+index f49df95..f496f7e 100644
+--- a/hw/net/xgmac.c
++++ b/hw/net/xgmac.c
+@@ -217,21 +217,31 @@ static void xgmac_enet_send(XgmacState *s)
+ }
+ len = (bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff) + (bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff);
+
++ /*
++ * FIXME: these cases of malformed tx descriptors (bad sizes)
++ * should probably be reported back to the guest somehow
++ * rather than simply silently stopping processing, but we
++ * don't know what the hardware does in this situation.
++ * This will only happen for buggy guests anyway.
++ */
+ if ((bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff) > 2048) {
+ DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s:ERROR...ERROR...ERROR... -- "
+ "xgmac buffer 1 len on send > 2048 (0x%x)\n",
+ __func__, bd.buffer1_size & 0xfff);
++ break;
+ }
+ if ((bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff) != 0) {
+ DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s:ERROR...ERROR...ERROR... -- "
+ "xgmac buffer 2 len on send != 0 (0x%x)\n",
+ __func__, bd.buffer2_size & 0xfff);
++ break;
+ }
+- if (len >= sizeof(frame)) {
++ if (frame_size + len >= sizeof(frame)) {
+ DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s: buffer overflow %d read into %zu "
+- "buffer\n" , __func__, len, sizeof(frame));
++ "buffer\n" , __func__, frame_size + len, sizeof(frame));
+ DEBUGF_BRK("qemu:%s: buffer1.size=%d; buffer2.size=%d\n",
+ __func__, bd.buffer1_size, bd.buffer2_size);
++ break;
+ }
+
+ cpu_physical_memory_read(bd.buffer1_addr, ptr, len);
+--
+1.9.1
+