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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc18
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-disclosure-in-virgl_cmd_ge.patch43
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0002-vhost-user-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-vg_resource_crea.patch41
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0003-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-vg_resource_attach.patch48
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0004-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-while-calling-vg_reso.patch50
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0005-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource.patch58
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0006-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_resource_att.patch49
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0007-vhost-user-gpu-fix-OOB-write-in-virgl_cmd_get_capset.patch49
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_1.patch54
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_2.patch67
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-1.patch42
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-2.patch59
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3582.patch47
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3607.patch43
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3608.patch43
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3682.patch41
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch68
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch127
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch53
19 files changed, 1000 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
index 3921546df7..568ef1be94 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -57,6 +57,24 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2020-27821.patch \
file://CVE-2021-20263.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3392.patch \
+ file://0001-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-disclosure-in-virgl_cmd_ge.patch \
+ file://0002-vhost-user-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-vg_resource_crea.patch \
+ file://0003-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-vg_resource_attach.patch \
+ file://0004-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-while-calling-vg_reso.patch \
+ file://0005-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource.patch \
+ file://0006-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_resource_att.patch \
+ file://0007-vhost-user-gpu-fix-OOB-write-in-virgl_cmd_get_capset.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3527-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3527-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3582.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3607.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3608.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3682.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3713.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3748.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3930.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-20196_1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-20196_2.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-disclosure-in-virgl_cmd_ge.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-disclosure-in-virgl_cmd_ge.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..981c237292
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-disclosure-in-virgl_cmd_ge.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3545
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 121841b25d72d13f8cad554363138c360f1250ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:03:56 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix memory disclosure in
+ virgl_cmd_get_capset_info (CVE-2021-3545)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Otherwise some of the 'resp' will be leaked to guest.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3545
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+virtio-gpu fix: 42a8dadc74 ("virtio-gpu: fix information leak
+in getting capset info dispatch")
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-2-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+index 9e6660c7ab..6a332d601f 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ virgl_cmd_get_capset_info(VuGpu *g,
+
+ VUGPU_FILL_CMD(info);
+
++ memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
+ if (info.capset_index == 0) {
+ resp.capset_id = VIRTIO_GPU_CAPSET_VIRGL;
+ virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(resp.capset_id,
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0002-vhost-user-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-vg_resource_crea.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0002-vhost-user-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-vg_resource_crea.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9aee47e39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0002-vhost-user-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-vg_resource_crea.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3544
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 86dd8fac2acc366930a5dc08d3fb1b1e816f4e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:03:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix resource leak in
+ 'vg_resource_create_2d' (CVE-2021-3544)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Call 'vugbm_buffer_destroy' in error path to avoid resource leak.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3544
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-3-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+index f73f292c9f..b5e153d0d6 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ vg_resource_create_2d(VuGpu *g,
+ g_critical("%s: resource creation failed %d %d %d",
+ __func__, c2d.resource_id, c2d.width, c2d.height);
+ g_free(res);
++ vugbm_buffer_destroy(&res->buffer);
+ cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ return;
+ }
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0003-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-vg_resource_attach.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0003-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-vg_resource_attach.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1718486405
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0003-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-vg_resource_attach.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3544
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From b9f79858a614d95f5de875d0ca31096eaab72c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:03:58 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix memory leak in
+ vg_resource_attach_backing (CVE-2021-3544)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Check whether the 'res' has already been attach_backing to avoid
+memory leak.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3544
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+virtio-gpu fix: 204f01b309 ("virtio-gpu: fix memory leak
+in resource attach backing")
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-4-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+index b5e153d0d6..0437e52b64 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+@@ -489,6 +489,11 @@ vg_resource_attach_backing(VuGpu *g,
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (res->iov) {
++ cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
++ return;
++ }
++
+ ret = vg_create_mapping_iov(g, &ab, cmd, &res->iov);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0004-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-while-calling-vg_reso.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0004-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-while-calling-vg_reso.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fc2fafe1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0004-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-while-calling-vg_reso.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3544
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From b7afebcf9e6ecf3cf9b5a9b9b731ed04bca6aa3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:03:59 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix memory leak while calling
+ 'vg_resource_unref' (CVE-2021-3544)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the guest trigger following sequences, the attach_backing will be leaked:
+
+ vg_resource_create_2d
+ vg_resource_attach_backing
+ vg_resource_unref
+
+This patch fix this by freeing 'res->iov' in vg_resource_destroy.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3544
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+virtio-gpu fix: 5e8e3c4c75 ("virtio-gpu: fix resource leak
+in virgl_cmd_resource_unref")
+
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-5-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+index 0437e52b64..770dfad529 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/vhost-user-gpu.c
+@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ vg_resource_destroy(VuGpu *g,
+ }
+
+ vugbm_buffer_destroy(&res->buffer);
++ g_free(res->iov);
+ pixman_image_unref(res->image);
+ QTAILQ_REMOVE(&g->reslist, res, next);
+ g_free(res);
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0005-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0005-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e70f3c02c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0005-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3544
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From f6091d86ba9ea05f4e111b9b42ee0005c37a6779 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:04:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix memory leak in
+ 'virgl_cmd_resource_unref' (CVE-2021-3544)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The 'res->iov' will be leaked if the guest trigger following sequences:
+
+ virgl_cmd_create_resource_2d
+ virgl_resource_attach_backing
+ virgl_cmd_resource_unref
+
+This patch fixes this.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3544
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+virtio-gpu fix: 5e8e3c4c75 ("virtio-gpu: fix resource leak
+in virgl_cmd_resource_unref"
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-6-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+index 6a332d601f..c669d73a1d 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+@@ -108,9 +108,16 @@ virgl_cmd_resource_unref(VuGpu *g,
+ struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
+ {
+ struct virtio_gpu_resource_unref unref;
++ struct iovec *res_iovs = NULL;
++ int num_iovs = 0;
+
+ VUGPU_FILL_CMD(unref);
+
++ virgl_renderer_resource_detach_iov(unref.resource_id,
++ &res_iovs,
++ &num_iovs);
++ g_free(res_iovs);
++
+ virgl_renderer_resource_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ }
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0006-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_resource_att.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0006-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_resource_att.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5efb87ca33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0006-vhost-user-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virgl_resource_att.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3544
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 63736af5a6571d9def93769431e0d7e38c6677bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:04:01 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix memory leak in
+ 'virgl_resource_attach_backing' (CVE-2021-3544)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If 'virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov' failed, the 'res_iovs' will
+be leaked.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3544
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+virtio-gpu fix: 33243031da ("virtio-gpu-3d: fix memory leak
+in resource attach backing")
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-7-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+index c669d73a1d..a16a311d80 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+@@ -287,8 +287,11 @@ virgl_resource_attach_backing(VuGpu *g,
+ return;
+ }
+
+- virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
++ ret = virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
+ res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++ if (ret != 0) {
++ g_free(res_iovs);
++ }
+ }
+
+ static void
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0007-vhost-user-gpu-fix-OOB-write-in-virgl_cmd_get_capset.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0007-vhost-user-gpu-fix-OOB-write-in-virgl_cmd_get_capset.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33e6a66193
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0007-vhost-user-gpu-fix-OOB-write-in-virgl_cmd_get_capset.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+CVE: CVE-2021-3546
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 9f22893adcb02580aee5968f32baa2cd109b3ec2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 20:04:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] vhost-user-gpu: fix OOB write in 'virgl_cmd_get_capset'
+ (CVE-2021-3546)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If 'virgl_cmd_get_capset' set 'max_size' to 0,
+the 'virgl_renderer_fill_caps' will write the data after the 'resp'.
+This patch avoid this by checking the returned 'max_size'.
+
+virtio-gpu fix: abd7f08b23 ("display: virtio-gpu-3d: check
+virgl capabilities max_size")
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3546
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210516030403.107723-8-liq3ea@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+index a16a311d80..7172104b19 100644
+--- a/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
++++ b/contrib/vhost-user-gpu/virgl.c
+@@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ virgl_cmd_get_capset(VuGpu *g,
+
+ virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(gc.capset_id, &max_ver,
+ &max_size);
++ if (!max_size) {
++ cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++ return;
++ }
+ resp = g_malloc0(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+
+ resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b1ad0423b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From e907ff3d4cb7fd20d402f45355059e67d0dc93e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 17:15:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 11/12] hw/block/fdc: Extract blk_create_empty_drive()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+We are going to re-use this code in the next commit,
+so extract it as a new blk_create_empty_drive() function.
+
+Inspired-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20211124161536.631563-2-philmd@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [b154791e7b6d4ca5cdcd54443484d97360bd7ad2]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20196
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/block/fdc.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/block/fdc.c b/hw/block/fdc.c
+index 4c2c35e22..854b4f172 100644
+--- a/hw/block/fdc.c
++++ b/hw/block/fdc.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@
+ } while (0)
+
+
++/* Anonymous BlockBackend for empty drive */
++static BlockBackend *blk_create_empty_drive(void)
++{
++ return blk_new(qemu_get_aio_context(), 0, BLK_PERM_ALL);
++}
++
+ /********************************************************/
+ /* qdev floppy bus */
+
+@@ -543,8 +549,7 @@ static void floppy_drive_realize(DeviceState *qdev, Error **errp)
+ }
+
+ if (!dev->conf.blk) {
+- /* Anonymous BlockBackend for an empty drive */
+- dev->conf.blk = blk_new(qemu_get_aio_context(), 0, BLK_PERM_ALL);
++ dev->conf.blk = blk_create_empty_drive();
+ ret = blk_attach_dev(dev->conf.blk, qdev);
+ assert(ret == 0);
+
+--
+2.31.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd442ccb8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-20196_2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 1d48445a951fd5504190a38abeda70ea9372cf77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 17:15:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 12/12] hw/block/fdc: Kludge missing floppy drive to fix
+ CVE-2021-20196
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Guest might select another drive on the bus by setting the
+DRIVE_SEL bit of the DIGITAL OUTPUT REGISTER (DOR).
+The current controller model doesn't expect a BlockBackend
+to be NULL. A simple way to fix CVE-2021-20196 is to create
+an empty BlockBackend when it is missing. All further
+accesses will be safely handled, and the controller state
+machines keep behaving correctly.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Fixes: CVE-2021-20196
+Reported-by: Gaoning Pan (Ant Security Light-Year Lab) <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20211124161536.631563-3-philmd@redhat.com
+BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1912780
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/338
+Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [1ab95af033a419e7a64e2d58e67dd96b20af5233]
+CVE: CVE-2021-20196
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/block/fdc.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/block/fdc.c b/hw/block/fdc.c
+index 854b4f172..a736c4d14 100644
+--- a/hw/block/fdc.c
++++ b/hw/block/fdc.c
+@@ -1365,7 +1365,19 @@ static FDrive *get_drv(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int unit)
+
+ static FDrive *get_cur_drv(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
+ {
+- return get_drv(fdctrl, fdctrl->cur_drv);
++ FDrive *cur_drv = get_drv(fdctrl, fdctrl->cur_drv);
++
++ if (!cur_drv->blk) {
++ /*
++ * Kludge: empty drive line selected. Create an anonymous
++ * BlockBackend to avoid NULL deref with various BlockBackend
++ * API calls within this model (CVE-2021-20196).
++ * Due to the controller QOM model limitations, we don't
++ * attach the created to the controller device.
++ */
++ cur_drv->blk = blk_create_empty_drive();
++ }
++ return cur_drv;
+ }
+
+ /* Status A register : 0x00 (read-only) */
+--
+2.31.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77a5385692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 05a40b172e4d691371534828078be47e7fff524c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 15:29:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: limit combined packets to 1 MiB (CVE-2021-3527)
+
+usb-host and usb-redirect try to batch bulk transfers by combining many
+small usb packets into a single, large transfer request, to reduce the
+overhead and improve performance.
+
+This patch adds a size limit of 1 MiB for those combined packets to
+restrict the host resources the guest can bind that way.
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210503132915.2335822-6-kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/05a40b172e4d691371534828078be47e7fff524c
+CVE: CVE-2021-3527
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ hw/usb/combined-packet.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/combined-packet.c b/hw/usb/combined-packet.c
+index 5d57e883dc..e56802f89a 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/combined-packet.c
++++ b/hw/usb/combined-packet.c
+@@ -171,7 +171,9 @@ void usb_ep_combine_input_packets(USBEndpoint *ep)
+ if ((p->iov.size % ep->max_packet_size) != 0 || !p->short_not_ok ||
+ next == NULL ||
+ /* Work around for Linux usbfs bulk splitting + migration */
+- (totalsize == (16 * KiB - 36) && p->int_req)) {
++ (totalsize == (16 * KiB - 36) && p->int_req) ||
++ /* Next package may grow combined package over 1MiB */
++ totalsize > 1 * MiB - ep->max_packet_size) {
+ usb_device_handle_data(ep->dev, first);
+ assert(first->status == USB_RET_ASYNC);
+ if (first->combined) {
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6371aced12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3527-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 7ec54f9eb62b5d177e30eb8b1cad795a5f8d8986 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 15:29:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] usb/redir: avoid dynamic stack allocation (CVE-2021-3527)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Use autofree heap allocation instead.
+
+Fixes: 4f4321c11ff ("usb: use iovecs in USBPacket")
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210503132915.2335822-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7ec54f9eb62b5d177e30eb8b1cad795a5f8d8986
+CVE: CVE-2021-3527
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ hw/usb/redirect.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+index 17f06f3417..6a75b0dc4a 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
++++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ static void usbredir_handle_iso_data(USBRedirDevice *dev, USBPacket *p,
+ .endpoint = ep,
+ .length = p->iov.size
+ };
+- uint8_t buf[p->iov.size];
++ g_autofree uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(p->iov.size);
+ /* No id, we look at the ep when receiving a status back */
+ usb_packet_copy(p, buf, p->iov.size);
+ usbredirparser_send_iso_packet(dev->parser, 0, &iso_packet,
+@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static void usbredir_handle_bulk_data(USBRedirDevice *dev, USBPacket *p,
+ usbredirparser_send_bulk_packet(dev->parser, p->id,
+ &bulk_packet, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+- uint8_t buf[size];
++ g_autofree uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(size);
+ usb_packet_copy(p, buf, size);
+ usbredir_log_data(dev, "bulk data out:", buf, size);
+ usbredirparser_send_bulk_packet(dev->parser, p->id,
+@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static void usbredir_handle_interrupt_out_data(USBRedirDevice *dev,
+ USBPacket *p, uint8_t ep)
+ {
+ struct usb_redir_interrupt_packet_header interrupt_packet;
+- uint8_t buf[p->iov.size];
++ g_autofree uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(p->iov.size);
+
+ DPRINTF("interrupt-out ep %02X len %zd id %"PRIu64"\n", ep,
+ p->iov.size, p->id);
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3582.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3582.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a88e29384
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3582.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 284f191b4abad213aed04cb0458e1600fd18d7c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 14:06:00 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/rdma: Fix possible mremap overflow in the pvrdma device
+ (CVE-2021-3582)
+
+Ensure mremap boundaries not trusting the guest kernel to
+pass the correct buffer length.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3582
+Reported-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210616110600.20889-1-marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-3582
+Upstream-Status: Backport [284f191b4abad213aed04cb0458e1600fd18d7c4]
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c
+index f59879e257..da7ddfa548 100644
+--- a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c
++++ b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ static void *pvrdma_map_to_pdir(PCIDevice *pdev, uint64_t pdir_dma,
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++ length = ROUND_UP(length, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
++ if (nchunks * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE != length) {
++ rdma_error_report("Invalid nchunks/length (%u, %lu)", nchunks,
++ (unsigned long)length);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ dir = rdma_pci_dma_map(pdev, pdir_dma, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!dir) {
+ rdma_error_report("Failed to map to page directory");
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3607.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3607.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0547c74484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3607.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 32e5703cfea07c91e6e84bcb0313f633bb146534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 14:46:34 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] pvrdma: Ensure correct input on ring init (CVE-2021-3607)
+
+Check the guest passed a non zero page count
+for pvrdma device ring buffers.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3607
+Reported-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210630114634.2168872-1-marcel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-3607
+Upstream-Status: Backport [32e5703cfea07c91e6e84bcb0313f633bb146534]
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_main.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_main.c b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_main.c
+index 84ae8024fc..7c0c3551a8 100644
+--- a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_main.c
++++ b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_main.c
+@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@ static int init_dev_ring(PvrdmaRing *ring, PvrdmaRingState **ring_state,
+ uint64_t *dir, *tbl;
+ int rc = 0;
+
++ if (!num_pages) {
++ rdma_error_report("Ring pages count must be strictly positive");
++ return -EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ dir = rdma_pci_dma_map(pci_dev, dir_addr, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!dir) {
+ rdma_error_report("Failed to map to page directory (ring %s)", name);
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3608.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3608.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..22d68b025d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3608.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 66ae37d8cc313f89272e711174a846a229bcdbd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 14:52:46 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] pvrdma: Fix the ring init error flow (CVE-2021-3608)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Do not unmap uninitialized dma addresses.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3608
+Reviewed-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: VictorV (Kunlun Lab) <vv474172261@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210630115246.2178219-1-marcel@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia.ml@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-3608
+Upstream-Status: Backport [66ae37d8cc313f89272e711174a846a229bcdbd3]
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_dev_ring.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_dev_ring.c b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_dev_ring.c
+index 074ac59b84..42130667a7 100644
+--- a/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_dev_ring.c
++++ b/hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_dev_ring.c
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int pvrdma_ring_init(PvrdmaRing *ring, const char *name, PCIDevice *dev,
+ qatomic_set(&ring->ring_state->cons_head, 0);
+ */
+ ring->npages = npages;
+- ring->pages = g_malloc(npages * sizeof(void *));
++ ring->pages = g_malloc0(npages * sizeof(void *));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ if (!tbl[i]) {
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3682.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3682.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50a49233d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3682.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 5e796671e6b8d5de4b0b423dce1b3eba144a92c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 09:27:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] usbredir: fix free call
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+data might point into the middle of a larger buffer, there is a separate
+free_on_destroy pointer passed into bufp_alloc() to handle that. It is
+only used in the normal workflow though, not when dropping packets due
+to the queue being full. Fix that.
+
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/491
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210722072756.647673-1-kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-3682
+Upstream-Status: Backport [5e796671e6b8d5de4b0b423dce1b3eba144a92c9]
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/redirect.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+index 4ec9326e05..1ec909a63a 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
++++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static int bufp_alloc(USBRedirDevice *dev, uint8_t *data, uint16_t len,
+ if (dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].bufpq_dropping_packets) {
+ if (dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].bufpq_size >
+ dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].bufpq_target_size) {
+- free(data);
++ free(free_on_destroy);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dev->endpoint[EP2I(ep)].bufpq_dropping_packets = 0;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33fca66d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 9a8f71ec660e67c51cc5905dd9d2a12ff78ce743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 14:05:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/12] uas: add stream number sanity checks.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The device uses the guest-supplied stream number unchecked, which can
+lead to guest-triggered out-of-band access to the UASDevice->data3 and
+UASDevice->status3 fields. Add the missing checks.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3713
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Chen Zhe <chenzhe@huawei.com>
+Reported-by: Tan Jingguo <tanjingguo@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210818120505.1258262-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 13b250b12ad3c59114a6a17d59caf073ce45b33a)
+Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [36403e8788a264dc96174f52584681ebcb4f54b1]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3713
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-uas.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
+index cec071d96..157734eb0 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
++++ b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
+@@ -831,6 +831,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ }
+ break;
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_STATUS:
++ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
++ goto err_stream;
++ }
+ if (p->stream) {
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(st, &uas->results, next) {
+ if (st->stream == p->stream) {
+@@ -858,6 +861,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ break;
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_IN:
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_OUT:
++ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
++ goto err_stream;
++ }
+ if (p->stream) {
+ req = usb_uas_find_request(uas, p->stream);
+ } else {
+@@ -893,6 +899,11 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+ break;
+ }
++
++err_stream:
++ error_report("%s: invalid stream %d", __func__, p->stream);
++ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
++ return;
+ }
+
+ static void usb_uas_unrealize(USBDevice *dev)
+--
+2.31.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4765f24739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From bacc200f623647632258f7efc0f098ac30dd4225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 13:44:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 09/12] virtio-net: fix use after unmap/free for sg
+
+When mergeable buffer is enabled, we try to set the num_buffers after
+the virtqueue elem has been unmapped. This will lead several issues,
+E.g a use after free when the descriptor has an address which belongs
+to the non direct access region. In this case we use bounce buffer
+that is allocated during address_space_map() and freed during
+address_space_unmap().
+
+Fixing this by storing the elems temporarily in an array and delay the
+unmap after we set the the num_buffers.
+
+This addresses CVE-2021-3748.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Fixes: fbe78f4f55c6 ("virtio-net support")
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [bedd7e93d01961fcb16a97ae45d93acf357e11f6]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3748
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/net/virtio-net.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+index 9179013ac..df1d30e2c 100644
+--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
++++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+@@ -1665,10 +1665,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
+ VirtIONetQueue *q = virtio_net_get_subqueue(nc);
+ VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
++ VirtQueueElement *elems[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
++ size_t lens[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct iovec mhdr_sg[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf mhdr;
+ unsigned mhdr_cnt = 0;
+- size_t offset, i, guest_offset;
++ size_t offset, i, guest_offset, j;
++ ssize_t err;
+
+ if (!virtio_net_can_receive(nc)) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,12 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+
+ total = 0;
+
++ if (i == VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE) {
++ virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net unexpected long buffer chain");
++ err = size;
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ elem = virtqueue_pop(q->rx_vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
+ if (!elem) {
+ if (i) {
+@@ -1710,7 +1719,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ n->guest_hdr_len, n->host_hdr_len,
+ vdev->guest_features);
+ }
+- return -1;
++ err = -1;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (elem->in_num < 1) {
+@@ -1718,7 +1728,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ "virtio-net receive queue contains no in buffers");
+ virtqueue_detach_element(q->rx_vq, elem, 0);
+ g_free(elem);
+- return -1;
++ err = -1;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sg = elem->in_sg;
+@@ -1755,12 +1766,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
+ virtqueue_unpop(q->rx_vq, elem, total);
+ g_free(elem);
+- return size;
++ err = size;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+- /* signal other side */
+- virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elem, total, i++);
+- g_free(elem);
++ elems[i] = elem;
++ lens[i] = total;
++ i++;
+ }
+
+ if (mhdr_cnt) {
+@@ -1770,10 +1782,23 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ &mhdr.num_buffers, sizeof mhdr.num_buffers);
+ }
+
++ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++ /* signal other side */
++ virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elems[j], lens[j], j);
++ g_free(elems[j]);
++ }
++
+ virtqueue_flush(q->rx_vq, i);
+ virtio_notify(vdev, q->rx_vq);
+
+ return size;
++
++err:
++ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++ g_free(elems[j]);
++ }
++
++ return err;
+ }
+
+ static ssize_t virtio_net_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+--
+2.31.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfbe5cee33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From cdca50eff9c38367be54f92839734ab490c8b0f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 17:31:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 10/12] hw/scsi/scsi-disk: MODE_PAGE_ALLS not allowed in MODE
+ SELECT commands
+
+This avoids an off-by-one read of 'mode_sense_valid' buffer in
+hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:mode_sense_page().
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3930
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Fixes: a8f4bbe2900 ("scsi-disk: store valid mode pages in a table")
+Fixes: #546
+Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <Qiuhao.Li@outlook.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [b3af7fdf9cc537f8f0dd3e2423d83f5c99a457e8]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3930
+
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
+index 90841ad79..5b44ed7d8 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
+@@ -1100,6 +1100,7 @@ static int mode_sense_page(SCSIDiskState *s, int page, uint8_t **p_outbuf,
+ uint8_t *p = *p_outbuf + 2;
+ int length;
+
++ assert(page < ARRAY_SIZE(mode_sense_valid));
+ if ((mode_sense_valid[page] & (1 << s->qdev.type)) == 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -1441,6 +1442,11 @@ static int scsi_disk_check_mode_select(SCSIDiskState *s, int page,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ /* MODE_PAGE_ALLS is only valid for MODE SENSE commands */
++ if (page == MODE_PAGE_ALLS) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ p = mode_current;
+ memset(mode_current, 0, inlen + 2);
+ len = mode_sense_page(s, page, &p, 0);
+--
+2.31.1
+