diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch | 103 |
1 files changed, 103 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ed1d12551 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +Fix for CVE-2014-0224 + +Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any +time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master +secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack. + +Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue +and providing the initial fix this patch is based on. + + +Patch borrowed from Fedora +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> + + +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200 +@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st + #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 + #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 + #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020 ++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080 + + /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we + * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200 +@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: + ++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto f_err; + } ++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + s->hit=1; + } + else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200 +@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start: + goto f_err; + } + ++ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) ++ { ++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); ++ goto f_err; ++ } ++ ++ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ++ + rr->length=0; + + if (s->msg_callback) +@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) + + if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) + { +- if (s->session == NULL) ++ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) + { + /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200 +@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: + ++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* we should decide if we expected this one */ + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: ++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + #else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) ++ { ++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; ++ } + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + #endif |