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AgeCommit message (Expand)Author
2009-09-15vagalume: Rename vagalume_0.7.bb as vagalume_0.7.1.bbKhem Raj
2009-03-17rename packages/ to recipes/ per earlier agreementDenys Dmytriyenko
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From 4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:09:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-48795: client side mitigation

Signed-off-by: Aris Adamantiadis <aris@0xbadc0de.be>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libssh/libssh-mirror/-/commit/4cef5e965a46e9271aed62631b152e4bd23c1e3c]
CVE: CVE-2023-48795
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
 include/libssh/packet.h  |  1 +
 include/libssh/session.h |  6 +++++
 src/curve25519.c         | 18 +++----------
 src/dh.c                 |  6 +----
 src/ecdh.c               |  7 +----
 src/ecdh_crypto.c        | 10 ++-----
 src/ecdh_gcrypt.c        | 10 +++----
 src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c    | 11 +++-----
 src/kex.c                | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 src/packet.c             | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 src/packet_cb.c          | 12 +++++++++
 11 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/libssh/packet.h b/include/libssh/packet.h
index fbe09700..8800e16b 100644
--- a/include/libssh/packet.h
+++ b/include/libssh/packet.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_ext_info);
 SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexdh_init);
 #endif
 
+int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session);
 int ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(ssh_session session, uint32_t seqnum);
 int ssh_packet_parse_type(ssh_session session);
 //int packet_flush(ssh_session session, int enforce_blocking);
diff --git a/include/libssh/session.h b/include/libssh/session.h
index 23633cc2..b8810f54 100644
--- a/include/libssh/session.h
+++ b/include/libssh/session.h
@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ enum ssh_pending_call_e {
 /* Client successfully authenticated */
 #define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED 2
 
+/* The current SSH2 session implements the "strict KEX" feature and should behave
+ * differently on SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS. */
+#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT 0x0010
+/* Unexpected packets have been sent while the session was still unencrypted */
+#define SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED 0x0020
+
 /* codes to use with ssh_handle_packets*() */
 /* Infinite timeout */
 #define SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE -1
diff --git a/src/curve25519.c b/src/curve25519.c
index 167209f4..6eda5feb 100644
--- a/src/curve25519.c
+++ b/src/curve25519.c
@@ -166,12 +166,7 @@ int ssh_client_curve25519_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
   }
 
   /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-  if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
-    goto error;
-  }
-
-  rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
-  SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+  rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
   return rc;
 error:
   return SSH_ERROR;
@@ -297,15 +292,10 @@ int ssh_server_curve25519_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
         return SSH_ERROR;
     }
 
-    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-    rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-    if (rc < 0) {
-        goto error;
-    }
-
     session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
-    rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
-    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+
+    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+    rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
 
     return rc;
 error:
diff --git a/src/dh.c b/src/dh.c
index cc12fd46..33883f2d 100644
--- a/src/dh.c
+++ b/src/dh.c
@@ -735,11 +735,7 @@ int ssh_client_dh_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
   }
 
   /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-  if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
-    goto error;
-  }
-
-  rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
+  rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
   SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
   return rc;
 error:
diff --git a/src/ecdh.c b/src/ecdh.c
index f7fcaf13..1fef7ec9 100644
--- a/src/ecdh.c
+++ b/src/ecdh.c
@@ -72,12 +72,7 @@ int ssh_client_ecdh_reply(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
   }
 
   /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-  if (ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) < 0) {
-    goto error;
-  }
-
-  rc=ssh_packet_send(session);
-  SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+  rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
   return rc;
 error:
   return SSH_ERROR;
diff --git a/src/ecdh_crypto.c b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
index 24f21c03..7e5f0cc7 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_crypto.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_crypto.c
@@ -318,15 +318,9 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet){
         return SSH_ERROR;
     }
 
-    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-    rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-    if (rc < 0) {
-        return SSH_ERROR;;
-    }
-
     session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
-    rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
-    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+    rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
 
     return rc;
 }
diff --git a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
index e43cacea..c1db7f5d 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_gcrypt.c
@@ -362,17 +362,13 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet) {
         goto out;
     }
 
-
+    session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
     /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
-    rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-    if (rc != SSH_OK) {
+    rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+    if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
         goto out;
     }
 
-    session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
-    rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
-    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
  out:
     gcry_sexp_release(param);
     gcry_sexp_release(key);
diff --git a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
index fa350028..24924508 100644
--- a/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
+++ b/src/ecdh_mbedcrypto.c
@@ -293,16 +293,13 @@ int ssh_server_ecdh_init(ssh_session session, ssh_buffer packet)
         goto out;
     }
 
-    rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-    if (rc < 0) {
-        rc = SSH_ERROR;
+        session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
+	/* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+	rc = ssh_packet_send_newkeys(session);
+	if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
         goto out;
     }
 
-    session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
-    rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
-    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
-
 out:
     mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
     return rc;
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index 82686e4b..7f1bb324 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@
 
 /* RFC 8308 */
 #define KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT "ext-info-c"
+/* Strict kex mitigation against CVE-2023-48795 */
+#define KEX_STRICT_CLIENT "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"
+#define KEX_STRICT_SERVER "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"
 
 /* NOTE: This is a fixed API and the index is defined by ssh_kex_types_e */
 static const char *default_methods[] = {
@@ -521,6 +524,27 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_kexinit){
             goto error;
         }
 
+	/*
+	 * handle the "strict KEX" feature. If supported by peer, then set up the
+	 * flag and verify packet sequence numbers.
+	 */
+	if (server_kex) {
+	    ok = ssh_match_group(session->next_crypto->client_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
+			         KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
+	    if (ok) {
+		SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Client supports strict kex, enabling.");
+		session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    /* client kex */
+	    ok = ssh_match_group(session->next_crypto->server_kex.methods[SSH_KEX],
+			         KEX_STRICT_SERVER);
+	    if (ok) {
+		SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "Server supports strict kex, enabling.");
+		session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT;
+	    }
+	}
+
         /*
          * If client sent a ext-info-c message in the kex list, it supports
          * RFC 8308 extension negotiation.
@@ -778,21 +802,21 @@ int ssh_set_client_kex(ssh_session session)
         return SSH_OK;
     }
 
-    /* Here we append  ext-info-c  to the list of kex algorithms */
+    /* Here we append ext-info-c and kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com to the list of kex algorithms */
     kex = client->methods[SSH_KEX];
     len = strlen(kex);
-    if (len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2 < len) {
+    /* Comma, comma, nul byte */
+    kex_len = len + 1 + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 1 + strlen(KEX_STRICT_CLIENT ) + 1;
+    if (kex_len >= MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
         /* Overflow */
         return SSH_ERROR;
     }
-    kex_len = len + strlen(KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT) + 2; /* comma, NULL */
     kex_tmp = realloc(kex, kex_len);
     if (kex_tmp == NULL) {
-        free(kex);
         ssh_set_error_oom(session);
         return SSH_ERROR;
     }
-    snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT);
+    snprintf(kex_tmp + len, kex_len - len, ",%s,%s", KEX_EXTENSION_CLIENT, KEX_STRICT_CLIENT);
     client->methods[SSH_KEX] = kex_tmp;
 
     return SSH_OK;
diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
index 61a44237..8025a7ff 100644
--- a/src/packet.c
+++ b/src/packet.c
@@ -1126,6 +1126,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
             }
 #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
             payloadsize = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
+	    if (session->recv_seq == UINT32_MAX) {
+		/* Overflowing sequence numbers is always fishy */
+		if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
+		    /* don't allow sequence number overflow when unencrypted */
+		    ssh_set_error(session,
+				  SSH_FATAL,
+				  "Incoming sequence number overflow");
+		    goto error;
+		} else {
+		    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING,
+			    "Incoming sequence number overflow");
+		}
+	    }
             session->recv_seq++;
             if (session->raw_counter != NULL) {
                 session->raw_counter->in_bytes += payloadsize;
@@ -1141,7 +1154,19 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
             SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET,
                     "packet: read type %hhd [len=%d,padding=%hhd,comp=%d,payload=%d]",
                     session->in_packet.type, packet_len, padding, compsize, payloadsize);
-
+	    if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
+		/* In strict kex, only a few packets are allowed. Taint the session
+		 * if we received packets that are normally allowed but to be
+		 * refused if we are in strict kex when KEX is over.
+		 */
+		uint8_t type = session->in_packet.type;
+
+		if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS &&
+		    (type < SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT ||
+		     type > SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) {
+		    session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+		}
+	    }
             /* Check if the packet is expected */
             filter_result = ssh_packet_incoming_filter(session);
 
@@ -1153,6 +1178,9 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
             case SSH_PACKET_DENIED:
                 goto error;
             case SSH_PACKET_UNKNOWN:
+		if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
+		    session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+		}
                 ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq - 1);
                 break;
             }
@@ -1276,9 +1304,35 @@ void ssh_packet_process(ssh_session session, uint8_t type){
 	if(r==SSH_PACKET_NOT_USED){
 		SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_RARE,"Couldn't do anything with packet type %d",type);
 		ssh_packet_send_unimplemented(session, session->recv_seq-1);
+		if (session->current_crypto == NULL) {
+		    session->flags |= SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED;
+		}
 	}
 }
 
+/** @internal
+ * @brief sends a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS when enabling the new negotiated ciphers
+ * @param session the SSH session
+ * @return SSH_ERROR on error, else SSH_OK
+ */
+int ssh_packet_send_newkeys(ssh_session session)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    /* Send the MSG_NEWKEYS */
+    rc = ssh_buffer_add_u8(session->out_buffer, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    rc = ssh_packet_send(session);
+    if (rc == SSH_ERROR) {
+	return rc;
+    }
+    SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_DEBUG, "SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+    return rc;
+}
+
 /** @internal
  * @brief sends a SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED answer to an unhandled packet
  * @param session the SSH session
diff --git a/src/packet_cb.c b/src/packet_cb.c
index 6aa64766..de03fb07 100644
--- a/src/packet_cb.c
+++ b/src/packet_cb.c
@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_newkeys){
       goto error;
   }
 
+  if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_STRICT) {
+      /* reset packet sequence number when running in strict kex mode */
+      session->recv_seq = 0;
+      /* Check that we aren't tainted */
+      if (session->flags & SSH_SESSION_FLAG_KEX_TAINTED) {
+	  ssh_set_error(session,
+			SSH_FATAL,
+			"Received unexpected packets in strict KEX mode.");
+	  goto error;
+      }
+}
+
   if(session->server){
     /* server things are done in server.c */
     session->dh_handshake_state=DH_STATE_FINISHED;
-- 
2.25.1