diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools/patch')
7 files changed, 373 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch.inc index cbfb8cfcf5..a12d426b2c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch.inc @@ -10,5 +10,5 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/patch-${PV}" inherit autotools update-alternatives -ALTERNATIVE_${PN} = "patch" +ALTERNATIVE:${PN} = "patch" ALTERNATIVE_PRIORITY = "100" diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-ed-style-patch.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-ed-style-patch.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..78345e925e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-ed-style-patch.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 7f770b9c20da1a192dad8cb572a6391f2773285a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> +Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 14:31:55 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Don't leak temporary file on failed ed-style patch + +Now that we write ed-style patches to a temporary file before we +apply them, we need to ensure that the temporary file is removed +before we leave, even on fatal error. + +* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Use global TMPEDNAME instead of local + tmpname. Don't unlink the file directly, instead tag it for removal + at exit time. +* src/patch.c (cleanup): Unlink TMPEDNAME at exit. + +This closes bug #53820: +https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53820 + +Fixes: 123eaff0d5d1 ("Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches (CVE-2018-1000156)") + +CVE: CVE-2018-1000156 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=19599883ffb6a450d2884f081f8ecf68edbed7ee] +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com> +--- + src/common.h | 2 ++ + src/pch.c | 12 +++++------- + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common.h b/src/common.h +index ec50b40..22238b5 100644 +--- a/src/common.h ++++ b/src/common.h +@@ -94,10 +94,12 @@ XTERN char const *origsuff; + XTERN char const * TMPINNAME; + XTERN char const * TMPOUTNAME; + XTERN char const * TMPPATNAME; ++XTERN char const * TMPEDNAME; + + XTERN bool TMPINNAME_needs_removal; + XTERN bool TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal; + XTERN bool TMPPATNAME_needs_removal; ++XTERN bool TMPEDNAME_needs_removal; + + #ifdef DEBUGGING + XTERN int debug; +diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c +index 16e001a..c1a62cf 100644 +--- a/src/pch.c ++++ b/src/pch.c +@@ -2392,7 +2392,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + file_offset beginning_of_this_line; + size_t chars_read; + FILE *tmpfp = 0; +- char const *tmpname; + int tmpfd; + pid_t pid; + +@@ -2404,12 +2403,13 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which + can lead to arbitrary command execution. */ + +- tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0); ++ tmpfd = make_tempfile (&TMPEDNAME, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0); + if (tmpfd == -1) +- pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname)); ++ pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME)); ++ TMPEDNAME_needs_removal = true; + tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b"); + if (! tmpfp) +- pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname)); ++ pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME)); + } + + for (;;) { +@@ -2449,8 +2449,7 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + write_fatal (); + + if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1) +- pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname)); +- ++ pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME)); + if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) { + int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL; + *outname_needs_removal = true; +@@ -2482,7 +2481,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + } + + fclose (tmpfp); +- safe_unlink (tmpname); + + if (ofp) + { +-- +2.17.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ffffef47e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 369dcccdfa6336e5a873d6d63705cfbe04c55727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> +Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 15:14:45 +0200 +Subject: Don't leak temporary file on failed multi-file ed-style patch + +The previous fix worked fine with single-file ed-style patches, but +would still leak temporary files in the case of multi-file ed-style +patch. Fix that case as well, and extend the test case to check for +it. + +* src/patch.c (main): Unlink TMPEDNAME if needed before moving to + the next file in a patch. + +This closes bug #53820: +https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53820 + +Fixes: 123eaff0d5d1 ("Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches (CVE-2018-1000156)") +Fixes: 19599883ffb6 ("Don't leak temporary file on failed ed-style patch") + +CVE: CVE-2018-1000156 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=369dcccdfa6336e5a873d6d63705cfbe04c55727] +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com> +--- + src/patch.c | 1 + + tests/ed-style | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c +index 9146597..81c7a02 100644 +--- a/src/patch.c ++++ b/src/patch.c +@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) + } + remove_if_needed (TMPOUTNAME, &TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal); + } ++ remove_if_needed (TMPEDNAME, &TMPEDNAME_needs_removal); + + if (! skip_rest_of_patch && ! file_type) + { +diff --git a/tests/ed-style b/tests/ed-style +index 6b6ef9d..504e6e5 100644 +--- a/tests/ed-style ++++ b/tests/ed-style +@@ -38,3 +38,34 @@ EOF + check 'cat foo' <<EOF + foo + EOF ++ ++# Test the case where one ed-style patch modifies several files ++ ++cat > ed3.diff <<EOF ++--- foo +++++ foo ++1c ++bar ++. ++--- baz +++++ baz ++0a ++baz ++. ++EOF ++ ++# Apparently we can't create a file with such a patch, while it works fine ++# when the file name is provided on the command line ++cat > baz <<EOF ++EOF ++ ++check 'patch -e -i ed3.diff' <<EOF ++EOF ++ ++check 'cat foo' <<EOF ++bar ++EOF ++ ++check 'cat baz' <<EOF ++baz ++EOF +-- +cgit v1.0-41-gc330 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d13d419f51 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/0001-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org> +Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell + +* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell +command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities. + +CVE: CVE-2019-13638 CVE-2018-20969 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/patch/?id=3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0] +Signed-off-by: Trevor Gamblin <trevor.gamblin@windriver.com> + +--- + src/pch.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + + +diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c +index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644 +--- a/src/pch.c ++++ b/src/pch.c +@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + *outname_needs_removal = true; + copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true); + } +- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program, +- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ", +- outname); + fflush (stdout); + + pid = fork(); +@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname, + else if (pid == 0) + { + dup2 (tmpfd, 0); +- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0); ++ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-'); ++ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL); + _exit (2); + } + else +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8059d9fe19 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org> +Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200 +Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given + +* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file, +append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with +the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing +that consistently for input files. +* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them +with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well. + +CVE: CVE-2019-13636 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/patch/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a] +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com> + +--- + src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++-- + src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c +index 32d0919..22d7473 100644 +--- a/src/inp.c ++++ b/src/inp.c +@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename) + { + if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode)) + { +- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0); ++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput; + size_t buffered = 0, n; ++ int ifd; ++ ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0); + if (ifd < 0) + pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename)); + +@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename) + static void + plan_b (char const *filename) + { ++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput; + int ifd; + FILE *ifp; + int c; +@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename) + + if (instat.st_size == 0) + filename = NULL_DEVICE; +- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0 ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0 + || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r"))) + pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename)); + if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal) +diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c +index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644 +--- a/src/util.c ++++ b/src/util.c +@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original) + + try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT; + safe_unlink (bakname); +- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0) ++ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0) + { + if (errno != try_makedirs_errno) + pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname)); +@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode, + static void + copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd) + { ++ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY; + int fromfd; + ssize_t i; + +- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0) ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0) + pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from)); + while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0) + { +@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost, + else + { + assert (S_ISREG (mode)); ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode, + to_dir_known_to_exist); + copy_to_fd (from, tofd); +@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost, + void + append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to) + { ++ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY; + int tofd; + +- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) ++ if (! follow_symlinks) ++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; ++ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0) + pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to)); + copy_to_fd (from, tofd); + if (close (tofd) != 0) +-- +cgit v1.0-41-gc330 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-20633.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-20633.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b2c07cf1e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2019-20633.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 15b158db3ae11cb835f2eb8d2eb48e09d1a4af48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org> +Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 19:10:02 +0200 +Subject: Avoid invalid memory access in context format diffs + +* src/pch.c (another_hunk): Avoid invalid memory access in context format +diffs. + +CVE: CVE-2019-20633 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/patch/?id=15b158db3ae11cb835f2eb8d2eb48e09d1a4af48] +Signed-off-by: Scott Murray <scott.murray@konsulko.com> + +--- + src/pch.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c +index a500ad9..cb54e03 100644 +--- a/src/pch.c ++++ b/src/pch.c +@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + ptrn_prefix_context = context; + ptrn_suffix_context = context; + if (repl_beginning ++ || p_end <= 0 + || (p_end + != p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n'))) + { +-- +cgit v1.2.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb index 85b0db7333..e0e44f9c97 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ require patch.inc -LICENSE = "GPLv3" +LICENSE = "GPL-3.0-only" SRC_URI += "file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \ file://0002-Fix-segfault-with-mangled-rename-patch.patch \ file://0003-Allow-input-files-to-be-missing-for-ed-style-patches.patch \ file://0004-Fix-arbitrary-command-execution-in-ed-style-patches-.patch \ file://0001-Fix-swapping-fake-lines-in-pch_swap.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-13636.patch \ + file://0001-Invoke-ed-directly-instead-of-using-the-shell.patch \ + file://0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-ed-style-patch.patch \ + file://0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-20633.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4c68cee989d83c87b00a3860bcd05600" @@ -18,3 +23,6 @@ acpaths = "-I ${S}/m4 " PACKAGECONFIG ?= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'xattr', d)}" PACKAGECONFIG[xattr] = "--enable-xattr,--disable-xattr,attr," +PROVIDES:append:class-native = " patch-replacement-native" + +BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk" |