1 files changed, 0 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ccb99da81..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Fei Li <lifeibiren@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled
-
-The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned
-out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a
-local proxy program with no content-length present.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/6d342b50366a048d3d543952e2be271b5742c5f8]
-CVE: CVE-2020-26154
-Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
-
----
- libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
-index ee776b2..8684086 100644
---- a/libproxy/url.cpp
-+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std;
- #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain"
- 
- // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks)
--#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400
-+#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000
- // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP
- #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512
- 
-@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
- 		}
- 
- 		// Get content
--		unsigned int recvd = 0;
--		buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE];
--		memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE);
-+		std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer;
- 		do {
- 			unsigned int chunk_length;
- 
- 			if (chunked) {
- 				// Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk
--				if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock);
-+				if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock);
- 
- 				// Get the chunk-length line as an integer
- 				if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break;
-@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
- 
- 			if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
- 
--			while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) {
--				int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd,
--				             content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE
--				                                 : content_length - recvd, 0);
-+			while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) {
-+				// Calculate length to recv
-+				unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+				if (content_length > 0)
-+					length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size();
-+
-+				// Prepare buffer
-+				dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read);
-+
-+				int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0);
-+
-+				// Shrink buffer to fit
-+				if (r >= 0)
-+					dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r);
-+
-+				// PAC size too large, discard
-+				if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) {
-+					chunked = false;
-+					dynamic_buffer.clear();
-+					break;
-+				}
-+
- 				if (r <= 0) {
- 					chunked = false;
- 					break;
- 				}
--				recvd += r;
- 			}
- 		} while (chunked);
- 
--		if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) {
--			delete[] buffer;
--			buffer = NULL;
-+		if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) {
-+			buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1];
-+			if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) {
-+				memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size());
-+			}
-+			buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0';
- 		}
- 	}
-